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LEGALITY, MORALITY, DUALITY
Joshua P. Davis*
Abstract
This Article proposes legal dualism as a novel resolution to one of
the central debates in jurisprudence—that between natural law and legal
positivism. It holds that the nature of law varies with the purpose for
which it is being interpreted. Natural law provides the best account of
the law when it serves as a source of moral guidance and legal
positivism provides the best account of the law when it does not.
The Article explores dualism by contrasting it with the defense of
legal positivism in Scott Shapiro’s justly renowned book, Legality.
Shapiro offers arguably the most sophisticated defense of positivism to
date. This Article argues that it does not succeed when the law imposes
moral obligations, suggesting a limitation in positivism itself.
Dualism has profound implications. First, it allows us to hold
judges accountable for their moral judgments, even when they are
merely saying what the law is. Legal positivism can foreclose this
possibility.
Second, dualism permits moral argument in support of a particular
account of the law, including the theory Shapiro offers, the Planning
Theory. Positivism can render unavailable the moral foundation that a
theory of law, like the Planning Theory, deserves and that it needs when
the law creates moral obligations.
Third, and more generally, dualism holds the potential to move us
beyond decades—even centuries—of stalemate between proponents of
natural law and positivism. By recognizing that each theory has its
place, dualism can advance discussion to the more productive issues of
whether the law creates moral obligations and, if so, under what
circumstances.

* © 2014 Joshua P. Davis. Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, Professor, and
Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University San Francisco School of Law. I am
grateful for comments from Shalanda Baker, Deborah Hussey Freeland, Susan Freiwald,
Bill Hing, Alice Kaswan, John Shafer, Steve Shatz, and Michelle Travis. I am particularly
indebted for conversations with Josh Rosenberg, Scott Shapiro, and Manuel Vargas. All
provided me valuable comments that refined my thinking and saved me from important
errors. I am solely responsible for those that remain.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article pursues a novel thesis: that the nature of law is not singular but
rather dual. More specifically, it explores the possibility that natural law provides
the best understanding of the law when it serves as a source of moral guidance and
that legal positivism provides the best understanding of the law when it does not.
As a way to make this ambitious task manageable, the Article develops legal
dualism by contrasting it with the argument in Scott Shapiro’s justly renowned
book on jurisprudence, Legality. 1
Legality is noteworthy for various achievements, including its valuable
explanation of the relevance of jurisprudence to the practice of law, 2 its insightful
account of fundamental issues in jurisprudence, 3 its clear distillation of the
contributions of several great jurisprudents, and its incisive evaluations of those
contributions. 4 More generally, Legality is rightly perceived as one of the most
important books on jurisprudence in recent decades 5 and arguably the most

1

SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011).
See id. at 22–25, 30–32.
3
See id. at 1–34.
4
See id. at 51–117 (discussing John Austin and H.L.A. Hart); id. at 259–330
(discussing Ronald Dworkin).
5
See Judith Baer, Book Review, 126 POL. SCI. Q. 696, 696 (2011) (“Nevertheless,
Legality makes a contribution to the field that no student of jurisprudence can ignore.”);
Brian H. Bix, Book Review, 122 ETHICS 444, 444 (2012) (“In Legality, Scott Shapiro
offers a theory of the nature of law but also an elaboration and defense of conceptual
analysis and an argument about the proper approach to legal interpretation, with sharp
insights and provocative arguments spread throughout the work. It is an undoubtedly
important contribution to the jurisprudential literature.”); Thomas P. Crocker, Whom
Should You Trust? Plans, Pragmatism, and Legality, 47 TULSA L. REV. 205, 217 (2011)
(book review) (“Because of its philosophical richness, Legality will undoubtedly structure
many conversations in law and philosophy for years to come.”); David Dyzenhaus,
Legality Without the Rule of Law? Scott Shapiro on Wicked Legal Systems, 25 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 183, 198 (2012) (book review) (“Shapiro’s book is an argument in
‘analytic jurisprudence’ and it may be the finest example of this method to date.”); Mark C.
Murphy, Book Review, 30 LAW & PHIL. 369, 375 (2011) (“[T]his book is throughout a
very fine contribution to jurisprudence—imaginative, incisive, fair to interlocutors, and
written with elegance and wit. . . . It is essential reading for philosophers of law.”);
Frederick Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALE L.J. 586, 619 (2010) (book review)
(“[Shapiro] has written an important book and, in showing how the pervasive activity of
social planning requires the institutions that we associate with law, he has provided a novel
and valuable addition to the literature on why law exists, how it develops, and what allows
it to flourish.”); Gideon Yaffe, Book Review, 121 PHIL. REV. 457, 460 (2012) (“In drawing
attention to the roles that law plays in social planning, and to the implications of the fact
that law plays such roles, Shapiro has opened the door to a way of linking traditional
problems of jurisprudence with reflection on the actual practice of law. This will be a
lasting and important contribution.”).
2
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sophisticated defense of legal positivism to date.6 Legality provides an opportunity
to assess the limits of legal monism and of positivism as a general account of the
nature of law.
This Article seizes on that opportunity. It proceeds in six parts. Part II begins
by reviewing two of Shapiro’s primary undertakings in Legality. The first is to
elaborate a new understanding of the nature of law, which he calls the Planning
Theory. 7 Shapiro offers a rich account of how law can be understood as a kind of
plan. The second is to provide a defense of legal positivism. 8
Part II summarizes Shapiro’s account of the Planning Theory and legal
positivism and explains how the two have the potential to be mutually supportive.
Shapiro contends that the Planning Theory permits proponents of legal positivism
to overcome the strongest objection to their theory. 9 If he is right, that would
furnish a powerful reason to accept not only positivism—by eliminating a key
objection to it—but also the Planning Theory because it is capable of solving a
major jurisprudential problem. 10 Shapiro also argues that the Planning Theory
requires a commitment to legal positivism. 11 Shapiro’s defense of legal positivism
thus intertwines with his argument for the Planning Theory.
Part III argues that Shapiro is not fully successful in two key ways. First, he
does not provide an adequate defense of legal positivism when the law serves as a
source of moral guidance. Shapiro may well be persuasive that legal positivism
offers the best account when it comes to describing the law or predicting how it
6

See Bix, supra note 5, at 446 (“Shapiro, in his earlier works and in Legality, has
defended the approach to law and legal theory known as ‘legal positivism’ (in fact, a fairly
unyielding form of legal positivism known as ‘exclusive legal positivism’).”); Crocker,
supra note 5, at 217 (“Shapiro’s account vindicates the central thesis of legal positivism—
that law’s existence does not depend on moral facts.”); Dyzenhaus, supra note 5, at 183
(“Rather it is Scott Shapiro, one of the leading positivist philosophers of law of the last 50
years, and whose book Legality is perhaps the first major advance in our understanding of
legal positivism since Gerald Postema’s Bentham and the Common Law Tradition.”); Ian
P. Farrell, On the Value of Jurisprudence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 187, 188 (2011) (book review)
(“[Legality] involves, first and foremost, the development of a sophisticated and
comprehensive theory of the nature of law—one that, Shapiro argues, resolves questions
that, up until now, legal positivism has found impossible to answer.”); Yaffe, supra note 5,
at 457 (“Scott Shapiro’s important new book, Legality, is the most thorough defense in
years of legal positivism. It is required reading in the field not just because of its powerful
responses to all the major objections to positivism but also because of its important insights
about the legal phenomena that theories of law must explain.”); see also Brian Tamanaha,
Legal Philosophers, Alien Civilizations, Monism versus Pluralism (Reflections on
Shapiro’s Legality), BALKINIZATION, (Jan 5, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2011/01/legal-philosophers-alien-civilizations.html (“Scott Shapiro’s new book, Legality
(2011), is a superb articulation and defense of exclusive legal positivism.”).
7
See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 118–233.
8
Id. at 259–400.
9
Id. at 282–352.
10
Id. at 119.
11
Id. at 119, 178.
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will be interpreted. But Part III contends that an interpreter morally bound to
follow the law 12 needs to reach a sufficiently determinate conclusion about the
content of the law. It further argues that at least in complex legal systems, like the
American system, achieving that determinacy often involves making judgments
about morality. Second, the Planning Theory does not in fact require legal
positivism; planning can be reconciled with natural law.
These points have ramifications for jurisprudence as a whole. Shapiro is one
of the most important voices regarding one of the central clashes in
jurisprudence—that between legal positivism and natural law. Given his mastery
of legal theory and the significance of his work, the shortcomings in his defense of
legal positivism suggest limitations in positivist theory itself.
There is a different way to proceed. If legal positivism founders for
interpreters who are morally bound by the law and natural law founders for
interpreters who are not, perhaps we can recognize a natural boundary between
two jurisprudential terrains. Part IV explores this possibility. In other words, it
suggests an understanding of the nature of law as dualistic. 13
Part IV then argues that although Shapiro assumes a monistic understanding
of the nature of law, his jurisprudential methodology should permit dualism. It also
addresses various challenges Shapiro’s analysis poses for natural law. None of
them provides a convincing basis for rejecting natural law and, with it, legal
dualism. Indeed, one of Shapiro’s criticisms of natural law actually applies to his
own version of legal positivism.
Shapiro claims that natural law limits the possibility for critique of the law. 14
Part V contends that it is Shapiro’s own position that would limit the potential for
criticism of the law. Herein lies irony. As Shapiro recognizes, an important
motivation behind modern legal positivism is to hold political actors, including
lawyers, accountable for identifying the content of the law. 15 Historically, the
English treated the law as natural and largely beyond reform. Legal positivists
sought to have people acknowledge that “laws were but expressions of human
will.” 16 They pursued recognition of the gap between what the law is and what it
should be so that it could be subjected to critical analysis.17 Shapiro embraces this
legacy. 18
12

Shapiro uses the label “moral legitimacy” when the law imposes moral obligations.
See id. at 180, 185.
13
Dualism contemplates two complementary understandings of the nature of law, not
the more extensive multiplicity of pluralism. See Tamanaha, supra note 6 (reflecting on
contemporary jurisprudence and the debate between monism and pluralism). I do not mean
to take the position that there are only two possible understandings of the nature of law, but
rather that only two are relevant for present purposes.
14
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 231–32.
15
See id. at 388–89.
16
Id. at 389 (quoting H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 26 (1982) (summarizing
Bentham’s views on legal positivism)).
17
See id. at 388–89.
18
See id.
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At the same time, however, Shapiro implies that law has an incorrigible,
discoverable nature. He attempts to draw a strong distinction between what the law
is and whether it imposes moral obligations. 19 According to his brand of
positivism, the first issue does not entail any moral judgments. 20 Identifying the
content of the law involves mere description, 21 no matter how strong a moral
argument might be made that the law should be understood otherwise.
This view is troubling. It could allow key legal interpreters to avoid taking
responsibility for their actions. In a generally just legal system, for example, a
judge could claim, first, that she is simply saying what the law is, not what it
should be and, second, that she has an obligation to follow the law. If the judge is
right on both counts, even if her rulings produce rank injustice, she might bear
little responsibility for them. Indeed, many observers may believe judges have an
obvious moral obligation to follow the law. Shapiro leaves them little room to
criticize judicial decision making. Part V argues that natural law provides the best
account of the law for interpreters seeking moral guidance from it. That
perspective allows us to hold judges accountable when they make moral judgments
in declaring what the law is.
Part VI concludes by addressing some additional implications of legal
dualism. It first notes that the commitment to legal positivism comes at a cost to
the case for the Planning Theory. Assuming theory informs practice, 22 and
assuming the positivist position that the content of the law depends ultimately only
on social facts, 23 one would have to abandon positivism to make a moral argument
in support of a particular theory of the nature of law, such the Planning Theory. 24
Legal dualism, in contrast, would free us to set forth the moral basis for the
Planning Theory that it deserves and that it needs when the law creates moral
obligations.
Part VI then explores a more sweeping implication of legal dualism:
jurisprudents should shift their focus. For too long natural lawyers and legal
positivists have scored points about the relative merits of their theories. If legal
dualism is right, neither side will ultimately prevail because each theory has its
19

See id. at 44–45.
Id. at 44–45, 188.
21
Id.
22
Shapiro makes this assumption. See id. at 22–25, 30–32.
23
Id. at 27 (citing JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 75 (2001);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 37 (1979); Gerald
J. Postema, Coordination and Conventions at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
165, 188 (1982)).
24
Shapiro avoids inconsistency by refraining from making moral arguments in
support of the Planning Theory. Indeed, he questions whether morally bad consequences
should provide a basis for rejecting any jurisprudential theory. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at
255 (“It is an interesting question whether a jurisprudential theory ought to be rejected
simply because its acceptance engenders morally bad consequences.” (citing Liam Murphy,
The Political Question of the Concept of Law, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 371 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001))).
20
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own appropriate domain. Natural law governs when the law serves as a source of
moral guidance and legal positivism governs when the law does not. The greatest
potential for understanding the nature of law lies neither in rehearsing familiar
arguments for natural law and positivism nor in devising new ones. It entails
mapping out the terrains in which law has moral legitimacy and in which it does
not.
II. LEGALITY
The analysis begins with Shapiro’s Planning Theory and its relationship to
legal positivism. Shapiro argues that the Planning Theory solves a fundamental
problem for a positivist account of the law and, in so doing, offers an important
reason to embrace the Planning Theory.
A. The Planning Theory
The Planning Theory lies at the heart of Legality. It holds that the law is a
kind of plan (or a plan-like norm). 25 The law, so understood, arises to contend with
various difficulties that beset complex societies. Shapiro calls these difficulties
“the circumstances of legality.” 26 They obtain when a community faces numerous
and serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, contentious, or
arbitrary. 27 So, for example, a society that engages in farming and ranching must
make numerous challenging decisions—whether to adopt a system of common or
private property (or some combination of the two), how to allocate private
property, how to delimit the rights of private property owners, and the like. 28
Various relatively informal means of handling these decisions are likely to prove
inadequate, “such as improvisation, spontaneous ordering, private agreements,
communal consensus, or personalized hierarchies.” 29 The problems are too knotty
and intricate, and the solutions too controversial and arbitrary. A coordinating
system is required to organize behavior. In other words, in the face of the
circumstances of legality, society needs to develop an elaborate plan. Shapiro
argues that the legal system meets that need. According to his Planning Theory of
Law, “legal systems are institutions of social planning and their fundamental aim is
to compensate for the deficiencies of alternative forms of planning in the
circumstances of legality.” 30
Shapiro’s Planning Theory leads to some interesting consequences. His
recognition that the law serves as a plan for resolving stubborn controversy, for
example, suggests that legal actors should take care when indulging their own
views of substantive justice. After all, the purpose of the plan may be to constrain
25

SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 225.
Id. at 170–73, 213–14.
27
Id. at 170, 213.
28
See id. at 158–89.
29
Id. at 170.
30
Id. at 171 (emphasis removed).
26
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just that sort of individualized judgment and the resulting uncertainty and
inconsistency. 31 Along these lines, a judge may undermine efforts to make the
outcomes of adjudication predictable by using her own moral judgment in
interpreting the law. Shapiro refers to the system for allocating responsibility for
exercising moral judgment as the “economy of trust.” 32 This economy may
instantiate a great deal of distrust regarding the competence or good faith of
judges. 33
Shapiro not only proposes the Planning Theory but also argues that it supports
a particular jurisprudential view called “exclusive legal positivism.” 34 Understanding his position requires two distinctions, one between legal positivism and
natural law and the other between exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal
positivism.
B. Legal Positivism
Shapiro offers two main ways to understand the nature of law: legal
positivism and natural law. 35 The difference between the two turns on the role of
descriptive and prescriptive claims. Shapiro subscribes to what one might call the
Social Facts Thesis: legal positivism holds that “all legal facts are ultimately
determined by social facts alone.” 36 Specifying social facts 37 involves only

31

See id. at 331–52.
See id. at 331–77.
33
See id. at 313–29 (arguing the U.S. legal system embodies substantial distrust of
legal interpreters).
34
Id. at 119, 271–78.
35
Id. at 27–30.
36
Id. at 27 & n.27 (citing JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 75 (2001);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 37 (1979); Gerald
J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundation of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
165 (1982)). Shapiro calls this proposition the “Ultimacy Thesis.” SHAPIRO, supra note 1,
at 269–70. However, although it may be more precise, I find this label less accessible than
the Social Facts Thesis, and it is less commonly used. See William A. Edmundson,
Shmegality, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 273, 273 (2011) (noting the “Social Fact Thesis” is the
standard term). Professor Brian Leiter uses the term “Social Thesis.” BRIAN LEITER,
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 66 (2007).
37
Shapiro usefully characterizes the relevant social facts as depending on “what
people think, intend, claim, say, or do.” SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 27. Further, although he
acknowledges controversy about the nature of the relevant social facts, he suggests a
“plausible” understanding of the relevant social facts along the following lines: “the fact
that legal officials treat the state conventions as having had the power to ratify the
Constitution makes it the case that the Constitution is legally binding on them.” Id. The
most important point for present purposes is that legal positivists claim that legal facts
ultimately depend on only social facts—and that specifying social facts involves only
descriptive claims, not moral claims.
32
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description, not prescription—saying what the law is, not what it should be. 38
According to legal positivism, a purely descriptive claim plays the ultimate role in
saying what the law is.
Shapiro is not as explicit as he might be about his definition of the word
“ultimately” in this context. But his discussion suggests it means something like
foundational or fundamental. 39 In other words, the foundation or basis for giving
content to the law is descriptive, not prescriptive. And no prescriptive claims are
necessary to support that foundation or basis. 40
Shapiro contrasts legal positivism with what he calls “natural law.” 41 Natural
law, according to Shapiro, claims that the content of the law ultimately depends at
least in part on moral facts, 42 not just on social facts. 43 So, for example,
constitutional law is a kind of natural law if the proper way to interpret the
Constitution depends ultimately in part on political theory. 44 If, on the other hand,
the right way to specify the content of constitutional doctrine involves only
recourse to social facts—if the content depends, say, only on prevailing practice—
then legal positivism provides the best understanding of the nature of constitutional
law. 45
Shapiro goes further than committing to legal positivism. He embraces its
exclusive version as opposed to its inclusive version. 46 According to Shapiro, both
38

See id.
Leiter, for example, uses the term “fundamental” at times in defining what I have
called the “Social Facts Thesis.” See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 36, at 66, 122.
40
Shapiro hedges in this regard. He attempts to remain agnostic about the nature of
social facts themselves and whether they are reducible to other factual claims (e.g., about
individual psychology and action) or require recourse to moral facts as well. SHAPIRO,
supra note 1, at 44. It is not clear this concession is merely marginal, but I will not pursue
the point in this Article.
41
Id. at 27. The term “natural law” is awkward—at least as applied to modern
theorists, including Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin—to the extent it implies some kind of
religious commitment. See, e.g., BRIAN H. BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 67
& n.2 (5th ed. 2009); Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV.
165, 165 (1982). However, similar to Shapiro, I follow other scholars in using this term.
42
I use the term “moral facts” to be consistent with Shapiro. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra
note 1, at 27. To say the content of the law depends on moral facts, for my purposes, means
merely that moral judgment is necessary to identify the content of the law, not that moral
judgment is or can be objectively correct or that moral facts can be identified in a particular
way. I do not mean to take a position about the ontological or epistemological status of
morality.
43
Id. Note that natural law, according to these definitions, is in a sense more modest
than legal positivism. If there were true symmetry, one might use the term “exclusive
natural law” for the position that only moral facts give content to the law and the term
“inclusive natural law” for the position that the content of the law depends ultimately only
on moral facts. However, in Shapiro’s system, a hybrid approach in which the law
ultimately depends on both social facts and moral facts, counts as a natural law position. Id.
44
Id. at 29.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 275.
39
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varieties of positivism embody the Social Facts Thesis. 47 Inclusive legal
positivism, however, allows morality to play a role in identifying the content of the
law, provided the relevant social facts so permit. Exclusive legal positivism, in
contrast, claims that morality plays no role in specifying the content of the law. 48
So, according to Shapiro, all legal positivists agree that which political actors
make authoritative pronouncements regarding the content of the law ultimately
depends on social facts—on the conventional practice, for example, in a particular
legal system. However, inclusive legal positivists believe those social facts may
permit some of those political actors, including judges, to make moral judgments
in determining the content of the law, whereas exclusive legal positivists would
not. 49 Imagine, for instance, that the relevant social fact—again, let us say
prevailing legal practice—allows judges to make moral judgments in specifying
the content of constitutional doctrine in the United States. As long as the content of
the law depends ultimately on only social facts, inclusive legal positivism can
account for our legal system. Exclusive legal positivists, however, insist that the
content of constitutional law does not depend on moral facts at all. They believe
that the content of the law depends only on social facts.50
Shapiro claims that the logic of planning requires exclusive legal positivism
because the point of a plan is in part to resolve the difficulties caused by the need
to make moral judgments. 51 He reasons that it is irrational to allow the very sorts
of moral judgments as part of the plan that the plan is designed to resolve. 52 As
Shapiro puts the matter, “the content of plans cannot be determined by facts whose
very existence the plans are supposed to settle.” 53
Exclusive legal positivists face a challenge in explaining how the law
ordinarily functions. One approach is to adopt what one might call formalism,
which Shapiro usefully describes as involving four commitments: (1) judicial
restraint—judges should always apply existing law, not modify or correct the law;
(2) determinacy—the law contains one and only one correct answer to every legal
question; (3) conceptualism—the law can be derived from abstract principles that
permit judges to derive proper legal answers in particular cases; and (4) amorality
47

Id. at 273.
To use Shapiro’s terminology, all legal positivists are committed to the “Ultimacy
Thesis,” that is, that “legal facts are ultimately determined by social facts alone.” Id. at 269.
Exclusive legal positivists also adhere to the “Exclusivity Thesis,” that is, that legal facts
are determined exclusively by social facts. Id. at 269, 271.
49
See id. at 270–71.
50
Exclusive legal positivists may have various reasons for reaching this conclusion.
Joseph Raz, for example, believes that the authoritative nature of the law requires that it
provide exclusionary reasons for complying with its dictates, that is, reasons that preclude a
legal interpreter’s reconsideration of the normative issues that were resolved in devising the
content of the law. See LEITER, supra note 36, at 129 (discussing Raz’s authoritative
directives).
51
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 275, 278.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 302.
48
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of adjudication—“judges must decide cases without [engaging in] moral
reasoning.” 54 A commitment to formalism understood in this way could support
exclusive legal positivism. A formalist faces little difficulty explaining the
separation between morality and law (although perhaps significant difficulty
accounting for actual legal practice).
However, Shapiro rejects formalism. He subscribes to H.L.A. Hart’s view that
the law is in significant measure indeterminate. 55 He further claims that in
resolving difficult legal issues—involving inconsistencies, ambiguities, or gaps—
interpreters often have to resort to purposivism, that is, to take into account the
purposes of the law. 56 And he acknowledges that sometimes adjudication—as
opposed to legal interpretation—calls for judges to make moral judgments. 57 How,
then, can interpreters avoid moral facts in identifying the content of the law?
Shapiro provides a complicated set of answers to this question.58 He suggests,
for example, that in determining the purposes of the law, judges should rely not on
their own moral judgments about the law but only on social facts—on a description
of the intentions of the relevant political actors.59 He further defines the law not to
include any moral judgments necessary to adjudicate particular cases.60 So if moral
judgment were necessary, for instance, to fill in a gap or resolve a conflict, Shapiro
would say that the judge could resolve the case by making new law but not by
finding existing law. 61 Similarly, if the law requires the judge to render a moral
judgment—to decide, for example, what is unreasonable or unconscionable—then
Shapiro would consider that moral judgment to be part of adjudicating claims but
not part of interpreting the law. 62 To be sure, in ordinary legal practice in the
United States, interpreters often define the law much more broadly. 63 Most
practitioners probably believe that identifying the content of the law, at times,
54

Id. at 241–42.
See id. at 248–52, 277–79 (discussing H.L.A. Hart’s view on indeterminacy).
56
See id. at 252–54.
57
Id. at 276.
58
See id. at 234–81.
59
See id. at 344–45.
60
See id. at 269–81.
61
See id. at 274.
62
Id. at 276.
63
Ronald Dworkin, a natural lawyer (as that term is defined in this Article), contends
that legal interpreters in actual practice understand themselves to be taking morality into
account in saying what the law is. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 187 (2006)
[hereinafter JUSTICE IN ROBES]; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 264–66 (1986)
[hereinafter LAW’S EMPIRE]; Jeremy Waldron, Planning for Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV.
883, 894–96 (2011) (reviewing SHAPIRO, supra note 1) (noting various ways in which law
appears to embody normative judgment). Jules L. Coleman, a legal positivist, concedes this
point and offers it as a reason—although not necessarily a dispositive one—to favor
inclusive legal positivism over exclusive legal positivism. Jules L. Coleman, The
Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2, 56–57 (2011). But see id. at 56 n.64
(claiming that exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism do not conflict but
rather operate at different levels of abstraction).
55
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includes making moral judgments. Shapiro’s exclusive legal positivism then
requires a somewhat unconventional—but not necessarily untenable—definition of
the law. 64
Shapiro adopts some positions that put tremendous pressure on his
commitment to exclusive legal positivism. He contends, for example, that the law
by its nature has a moral aim. 65 He needs to take this position because the Planning
Theory holds that “the fundamental aim of the law is to rectify the moral
deficiencies associated with the circumstances of legality.” 66 Shapiro appears to
view his claim about the moral aim of the law as consistent with legal positivism
because it is merely descriptive. That the law pursues a moral aim describes the
law, the way a shovel might be described as an implement designed for digging.
But that does not mean the law succeeds in the moral aim. As Shapiro explains,
“What makes the law the law is that it has a moral aim, not that it satisfies that
aim.” 67 According to Shapiro, this potential gap—between what law aspires to do
and what it actually does—makes it possible to identify the content of the law
without making any moral judgments about it.
C. Conceptual Analysis
That last point suggests a larger issue: whether Shapiro can make a nonmoral
case for the Planning Theory. He makes clear that he attempts to do so by relying
on a methodology he calls “conceptual analysis.” 68 Although he could offer a more
complete explication of the methodology, he explains that it involves attempting to
account for as many of the self-evident truths about law as possible. 69 According to
Shapiro’s conceptual analysis, an understanding of the nature of law succeeds, it
would seem, if it better accommodates the self-evident truths about law than any of
its competitors. 70
That conceptual analysis aspires not to entail moral judgment is crucial to
Shapiro’s project. 71 The reason is that he takes two positions that would otherwise

64
Shapiro seems to acknowledge that an exclusive legal positivist understanding of
the law is not always intuitive. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 270 (“One attractive feature
of inclusive legal positivism is that certain constitutional provisions may thus be taken at
face value.”); see also Coleman, supra note 63, at 56–57 (arguing inclusive legal
positivism provides an understanding of the law more consistent with how judges describe
their own practice than exclusive legal positivism).
65
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 213–17.
66
Id. at 213.
67
Id. at 214.
68
Id. at 13.
69
Id. at 13–22.
70
See id. at 15–16, 49–50.
71
Shapiro at one point suggests that it is unclear whether “a jurisprudential theory
ought to be rejected simply because its acceptance engenders morally bad consequences.”
Id. at 255.
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conflict. He claims, first, that legal theory informs the content of the law 72 and,
second, that the content of the law depends only on social facts.73 Given these two
positions, if legal theory required moral justification, then the content of the law
would ultimately depend in part on moral facts and the Social Facts Thesis would
fail. That would be fatal to Shapiro’s exclusive legal positivism and, indeed, even
to inclusive legal positivism.
D. Hume’s Law v. Evil Law
What, then, is the case that Shapiro makes for the Planning Theory based on
conceptual analysis? Shapiro never tallies up the relative successes of positivism
and natural law in accounting for the truisms about the nature of law. But a central
role in his overall argument appears to be played by key challenges that Shapiro
identifies for legal positivism and natural law. Legal positivism must contend with
Hume’s Law and natural law with Evil Law.74 Shapiro’s argument for the Planning
Theory seems to run in significant part as follows: the Planning Theory can
reconcile legal positivism with Hume’s Law, providing a powerful basis for
choosing positivism over natural law (which cannot be squared with Evil Law) and
for adopting the Planning Theory (it saves positivism from falling prey to Hume’s
Law). These points require elaboration.
Hume’s Law holds that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” 75 In other
words, descriptive claims cannot yield normative claims. A normative input is
necessary to produce a normative output. 76 To the extent that the law creates moral
obligations—to the extent the law has what Shapiro calls moral legitimacy 77 —
Hume’s Law poses a significant problem for legal positivism, especially for
exclusive legal positivism. 78 How can an account of law that depends ultimately—
or entirely—on purely descriptive claims yield moral obligations?
In a pleasing symmetry, Shapiro suggests that Evil Law creates a similar
problem for natural law. 79 Natural lawyers claim that determining the content of
the law requires recourse to moral facts. 80 It is hard to see what role moral facts
could play in an evil legal system, one that serves nefarious ends. Consider the law
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Id. at 22–25, 30–32
Id. at 275, 278, 302–03.
74
Id. at 45–50.
75
Id. at 47.
76
Id. at 48.
77
Id. at 180, 185.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 49–50.
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Shapiro treats this point as definitional of natural lawyers. Id. at 27. He attributes
the natural law position, so defined, to Ronald Dworkin, among others. Id. at 27 n.28. He
does note an alternative natural law position holding merely that immoral or unreasonable
laws are “defective as laws.” Id. (citing Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Jurisprudence, 9
LEGAL THEORY 241, 254 (2003)).
73
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of Nazi Germany. 81 What role could morality play in a legal system that is so
morally bankrupt? Yet Nazi law appears to qualify as law. 82
Shapiro attempts to escape this dilemma by arguing that the Planning Theory
reconciles legal positivism and Hume’s Law. 83 According to Shapiro, the Planning
Theory accomplishes this task by distinguishing between identifying the
obligations the law purports to impose and deciding whether the law actually
imposes moral obligations. 84 He also suggests that an interpreter understanding the
law as a plan will determine the content of the law through a purely descriptive
undertaking. 85 Moral facts play no role in saying what the law is. What the law is
and whether the legal interpreter has any moral obligation to abide by it are
separate questions. 86 In sum, Shapiro does not contest Hume’s Law 87—he accepts
that one cannot derive a prescriptive claim from a descriptive claim—but he argues
that the Planning Theory allows the inquiry into the content of the law to be purely
descriptive.
Shapiro’s main response to natural law then appears to be that it cannot
accommodate the truism that Evil Law qualifies as law, whereas his Planning
Theory allows legal positivism to account for the truism of Hume’s Law. 88
This brief summary does not do justice to Shapiro’s thoughtful and wideranging analysis. But it does provide the background necessary to explore the
major points in this Article, the first of which is that Shapiro’s Planning Theory
neither adequately defends legal positivism nor requires a commitment to
positivism.
III. MORALITY
For Shapiro’s argument, morality must play no role in identifying the content
of the law. 89 Yet Shapiro has trouble maintaining the separation between what the
81

Lon L. Fuller and H.L.A. Hart discuss the puzzle of Nazi law in their famous
debate. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 633 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 617–18 (1958). Additionally, Shapiro offers the law of the
Soviet Union as an example. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 49.
82
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 49.
83
Id. at 188.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 192. Frederick Schauer has suggested a similar approach. See Frederick
Schauer, Critical Notice, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 495, 507–09 (1994).
87
Contrast the position of Jules L. Coleman, who has suggested he may contest
Hume’s Law, although he has not yet done so. Coleman, supra note 63, at 76–79. For a
discussion of Coleman’s position and his need to address Hume’s Law, see Joshua P.
Davis, Jurisprudential Jujutsu 11 (Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 201201, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007307.
88
See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 50, 188.
89
If morality were to play a role in saying what the law is, then it would not be
possible to rely exclusively on social facts in identifying the content of the law.
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law is and what it should be, between the descriptive and the prescriptive. This Part
explores this point. It notes the ways in which morality plays an ineluctable role in
making the law sufficiently determinate to provide moral guidance. It further
suggests that, pace Shapiro, the Planning Theory does not in fact require legal
positivism.
A. The Ineluctable “Ought”
A difficulty for Shapiro’s argument is the potential for an implicit judgment
about morality—what one might call a hidden “ought.” Legal interpretation
appears often to require resolution of various moral issues, at least when an
interpreter seeks a sufficiently determinate result to guide conduct. Put differently,
in many cases it may be possible to say what the law is with reasonable precision
only by taking some position on what it should be. If so, the Planning Theory does
not solve legal positivism’s difficulty with Hume’s Law.
So, for example, a judge trying to decide cases will often recognize various
ways in which the law is ambiguous, inconsistent, or incomplete. 90 Some of these
instances of apparent indeterminacy occur at a relatively concrete level. A judge
applying a legal rule may have to take a position on whether a contractual term is
unreasonable or unconscionable. 91 At a greater level of generality, in formulating
the relevant legal rule—or selecting among potentially applicable rules—the judge
may have to decide how best to engage in legal interpretation. 92 The judge may
have to choose between relying on the relevant authoritative text, on the most
compelling purposes behind the text, on evidence of the intentions of the drafter or
drafters of the text, or on variations on and combinations of these and other
potential approaches. Similar difficulties may beset the judge’s efforts to identify
the authoritative text or texts. At yet greater levels of generality, the judge must
decide what the grounds are for choosing between these interpretive approaches, as
well as the grounds for resolving disputes about those grounds, and so on. 93
The cumulative effect of these sources of apparent indeterminacy at various
levels of generality is that there is so much play in the joints of the law—at least in
complex legal systems like the one we have in America—that legal interpreters
operating in good faith can reach different interpretations in a high proportion of
litigated cases. 94 Even if most judges would agree in some regards, there are
almost always some whose value judgments would lead them to adopt a minority
90

See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 256.
See id. at 246.
92
See id. at 256.
93
See id. at 304–05.
94
This is one of the more persuasive claims of Legal Realism. LEITER, supra note 36,
at 19–20. Shapiro acknowledges this pervasive indeterminacy. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra
note 1, at 257 (“It is no surprise, therefore, that U.S. constitutional law is highly (though
obviously not completely) indeterminate.”); id. at 383 (“[I]t is highly likely that metainterpreters will disagree with one another about the content of the planners’ shared
understandings and which methodologies are best supported by them.”).
91
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position. Unanimity about the law is relatively rare. It is in part for this reason that
practicing lawyers almost always hedge or speak in probabilities when predicting
how a court would rule in a particular case or on a particular issue. Few are the
occasions when they will say they know with absolute certainty what the outcome
would be. 95
An obvious way to reduce or eliminate this apparent indeterminacy is to rely
on moral judgment. 96 Morality can play a role, for example, in identifying what is
unreasonable or unconscionable. 97 Those standards seem to contain a moral
element. Morality also can figure in choosing between different potential
interpretations of a rule or between different potential rules, a decision that can
turn on which rule is best in some moral sense. 98
More generally still, the right approach to legal interpretation itself suggests
judgments about political theory and substantive justice, given that these issues
will inform an understanding about the relative legitimacy and competence—and
corresponding discretion—of various political actors in resolving the issues a court
must decide. Indeed, Shapiro recognizes this last point. He notes, for example, that
how a particular actor should go about interpreting the law may depend on why the
plan underlying the legal system warrants deference. 99 A plan may deserve
deference because it was the product of planners with “superior moral authority or
judgment”—what he calls an authority system—or because the plan itself contains
“morally good” laws that “further the fundamental aim of the law”—what he calls
an opportunistic system. 100 Shapiro suggests that legal interpreters in an authority
system should take a different approach than interpreters in an opportunistic
system. 101

95

This point likely applies with particular force before potential litigants know which
judge will preside in a case.
96
An alternative might be to adopt, for example, the most likely legal outcome. But
such an approach would require normative justification. The most likely outcome is not
necessarily the most attractive. Even if it were the most likely to be right, in some sense,
we might want to consider the relative harm done if it were to prove erroneous, much like
the calculation in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction. Moral judgment
would then likely figure in assigning that harm. For a discussion of minimizing error costs
in granting injunctions, see Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Revising
Injunction Doctrine, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 363, 372–97 (2003).
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Shapiro acknowledges the role for moral or other value judgments in these
circumstances. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 246. Of course, determining whether a
contractual provision is unreasonable or unconscionable could be understood as a
descriptive inquiry—an account, for example, of commercial practice. See LEITER, supra
note 36, at 30. But legal interpretation often will involve a more straightforward moral
judgment, a point that Shapiro concedes. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 246.
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SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 246.
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Shapiro largely accepts this characterization of the indeterminacy resulting
from disagreement regarding the content of the law. 102 He also acknowledges, as
just noted, that the issues giving rise to disagreement appear to have a moral
dimension—that, for example, the appropriate interpretive methodology for a
given political actor depends in part on whether the planners of the system had
superior moral authority or judgment and whether the plan itself includes rules that
are morally good. 103 His burden, then, is to reconcile this state of affairs with a
positivist approach to identifying the content of the law.
Note that such legal indeterminacy poses no similar difficulty for interpreters
who seek merely to describe the law or to predict legal rulings, not to obtain moral
guidance from the law. 104 A historian or sociologist, for example, might be
perfectly comfortable offering an account of a particular jurisdiction’s law leaving
all of the disagreements intact, as might a participant in a legal system concerned
about the content of the law for purely prudential reasons. Consider a citizen who
believes the law lacks moral legitimacy. She may want to predict the practical legal
consequences of her conduct. But she would not care how disagreements or
uncertainties should be resolved in theory, merely how they will be resolved. An
accurate stochastic forecast may well be the best she can do and the most she cares
to do. 105
The same is not true, however, for interpreters who see the law as a potential
source of moral guidance. Judges offer a likely example. 106 Assuming they have a
moral obligation in general to follow the law, judges cannot tolerate pervasive
indeterminacy. The law would then not provide them guidance. A straightforward
way for them to reach sufficiently determinate results would be to take positions
on moral issues regarding which there is disagreement, including how to apply the
law, how to determine the relevant legal rule, how to choose the grounds for
102

See id. at 283 (stating disagreements about interpretive method “seem not only
possible, but pervasive”); see also id. at 379 (acknowledging the possibility of “pervasive
disagreement”).
103
Id. at 350−51.
104
Thus, a version of legal positivism that limits itself to prediction and description
need not contend with Hume’s Law, although it then makes no effort to provide an account
of the law as providing guidance. That is how I read, for example, Leiter’s rational
reconstruction of Legal Realism. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 36, at 219; see also id. at
275 (“[T]he point is precisely that, so far, causal power is all we have to go on in
ontology.”).
105
Of course, predictability in adjudication may be achieved by finding patterns in
nonlegal explanations for legal interpretation. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 36, at 62–63.
This point, however, depends in part on how one demarcates the outer boundaries of what
counts as the law. What a legal positivist like Leiter defines as nonlegal, a natural lawyer
like Dworkin might well define as part of the law.
106
Judges, after all, voluntarily accept a position and take an oath that seems to
require them to abide by the law in their judicial capacity. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006)
(requiring each judge to take an oath promising to “faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon [them] . . . under the Constitution and laws of the
United States”).
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picking among potential legal rules, etc. By treating the result of their
determinations as the law, judges will be able to fulfill any moral obligation they
have to abide by the law. Shapiro, then, must contend with this seemingly crucial
and extensive role of morality in saying what the law is.
B. Theoretical Disagreements
One can frame the challenge for Shapiro arising from indeterminacy in terms
of the problem of “theoretical disagreements,” which serves as the basis for an
argument made by Ronald Dworkin. 107 The difficulty for Shapiro is that he must
specify which social facts matter in interpreting the law, and he cannot seem to do
so without taking a position on issues of political morality.
To understand this point, recall that positivism holds that the content of the
law is ultimately a matter only of social facts. 108 That does not mean there will
always be consensus about those social facts. For example, legal interpreters may
generally agree that the plain text of a statute—or, alternatively, its legislative
history—controls the outcome in a case, but they may disagree about some facts
necessary to interpret the text or the legislative history—about, for example, the
definition of a word or the events that produced legislation. As long as the
disagreement is about social facts—that is, as long as it is about which factual
description is most accurate—it would seem that positivism can provide an
adequate account of the law. An inquiry only into social facts is necessary to
specify the content of the law. However, theoretical disagreements raise difficulties
that do not seem susceptible to resolution by recourse to social facts alone.109
Theoretical disagreements arise when legal interpreters have different views
not about—or not only about—the social facts necessary to identify the content of
the law, but also about which social facts are relevant to legal interpretation. 110
Shapiro thus distinguishes between, respectively, whether the grounds of law
obtain and what the grounds of law are. 111 Consider the issue of whether the death
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. 112 Legal interpreters within our legal system may disagree on this
issue at various levels of generality, inter alia, about the relevant views of the
Framers or the citizenry at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights, about whether
the death penalty is cruel and unusual under a contemporary understanding of
those terms, about whether the original understanding or the modern understanding
should govern constitutional interpretation, and about the grounds for choosing
107

SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 282–83. Dworkin makes the argument, inter alia, in
Law’s Empire, supra note 63, at 4−5. Dworkin is viewed by many scholars as the most
formidable proponent of natural law and, judging by Shapiro’s extensive treatment of
Dworkin’s arguments in Legality, Shapiro likely shares this view.
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SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 269.
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See id. at 289.
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See id. at 285.
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Id.
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Id. at 384.
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between those and other potential interpretive methodologies. Some of these
disagreements may turn merely on social facts—for example, how to interpret
vague or ambiguous texts embodying the relevant views—but others arise over
which social facts matter to legal interpretation. The problem for legal positivism
is to make sense of the disagreements about which social facts are pertinent, that is,
about the grounds of the law—and to do so without recourse to moral facts.
Shapiro’s response to this problem is to rely on the decisions made by the
planners of the law. 113 According to his theory, an interpreter should consider the
planners’ objectives in creating the law and the economy of trust instantiated in
their plan. 114 Those judgments will then assist the interpreter in determining the
grounds of the law. They will enable the judge to choose how to decide whether
the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. Of course, different judges may
reach different conclusions about the proper method of interpretation. Crucially,
according to Shapiro, the disagreement will turn not on moral facts but on
competing views of social facts—facts about the intentions of the planners of the
legal system. 115
To borrow an example from Shapiro, as noted above, interpreters may take a
different approach to legal interpretation in an “authority system”—one in which
they defer to the political legitimacy or expertise of the planners—than in an
“opportunistic system”—one in which they defer to a plan merely because they
believe it contains morally attractive laws.116 According to Shapiro, in an authority
system, legal interpreters should defer to the views of the planners regarding the
relative competence and good faith of different actors in the legal system, whereas
in an opportunistic system, legal interpreters should privilege prevailing modern
views. 117 These attitudes, in turn, should shape the decision about the proper
interpretive methodology, so that, for example, if our system is authoritative—as
Shapiro contends it mostly is 118—then what matters for determining our economy
of trust is the views of the original planners, whereas in an opportunistic system,
what matters are the views of current participants in the system. 119
Unfortunately, this strategy replicates the problem Shapiro seeks to solve,
merely framing it at a greater level of abstraction. 120 In attempting to glean the
objectives and economy of trust of a legal system, there will be disagreements not
only about the relevant social facts, but also about which social facts are relevant
and even about the grounds for resolving those disagreements. Consider the
dispute about the Eighth Amendment. Should it be interpreted according to the
113

Id. at 345. Shapiro sometimes calls them “designers.” Id. at 344.
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For a similar argument, see Davis, supra note 87, at 5–6, 9–10 (characterizing this
strategy as the retreat to abstraction and arguing it is unsuccessful).
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views of the citizenry at the time of its adoption or their views today? 121 This
question is about which social facts matter. Even assuming there is some kind of
consensus that we are in an authority system, as opposed to an opportunistic
system, enlisting the views of the planners is apt to compound the disagreement
rather than to resolve it. Who counts as a planner? 122 Why? Shapiro elides this
difficulty by referring vaguely to the planners of the law and to the “conceptions of
political morality and human nature . . . presupposed by the law.” 123 But these
generalities do not suffice.
Nor is this a problem that arises solely at the margins. Shapiro’s approach
struggles in resolving a broad range of questions. Regarding interpretation of the
Constitution, for example, whose understanding of the original plan matters? The
drafters of the provision at issue? Other political representatives who participated
in its enactment? The citizenry at large? And is Shapiro right that we venerate the
Founding Fathers because of their political legitimacy or is it because of the
quality of the political system they put in place? Or is our legal system a hybrid of
authoritative and opportunistic, and, if so, how do we decide when each one
predominates? And how do we identify the grounds for resolving disagreements on
these issues—based on an historical consensus, a modern consensus, and, in either
case, a consensus among which actors? And what do we do in the likely case there
is no such consensus? In other words, there is no reason to believe legal
interpreters will agree about who the relevant planners are, about their conceptions
of political morality and human nature, or about the proper grounds for resolving
those disputes. To the contrary, these questions are all likely to give rise to further
disagreements. 124
Indeed, controversy permeates any effort to identify the content of the law, up
to and including legal theory itself. Shapiro, for example, views recourse to social
facts alone as the best and only proper means of addressing metainterpretive
questions—questions about the proper method of interpretation. 125 Dworkin, in
contrast, claims there is no alternative but to base legal interpretation in part on
moral and political theory. 126 This disagreement runs to the extremes of generality.
Shapiro’s ultimate philosophical methodology appears to eschew moral
judgment. 127 As noted above, it must if he is committed to positivism and believes
jurisprudence informs legal practice. 128 Dworkin, in contrast, claims legal
121

I do not intend to imply that these are the only options or that either is appropriate.
Others have noted this difficulty. See, e.g., John Gardner & Timothy Macklem,
Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVIEWS (Dec. 8, 2011), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/27609
-legality/ (reviewing SHAPIRO, supra note 1).
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id. at 383.
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See infra Part VI.A.
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interpretation ultimately is a branch of moral theory. 129 How are we to choose
between these theories?
Given this dispute, it is hard to see how Shapiro’s approach can avoid a
vicious infinite regress. He can postulate ever more abstract agreement regarding
what social facts are relevant to identifying the content of the law, but he provides
no reason to believe any such agreement exists. Disagreement can—and does—
infect every level of interpretation, not merely about social facts or about which
social facts are relevant to legal interpretation, but also about the grounds for
resolving disputes about which social facts are relevant, and so on. 130
Shapiro is too careful to miss this point. He recognizes that disagreements
beset efforts to rely on the planners’ views and to derive from them guidance about
interpretive methodology. 131 He offers two responses. The first is to speculate that
there nevertheless may be some consensus—even a thin shared understanding—
sufficient to support some interpretive methodologies and to rule out others. But he
does not make an adequate case that there is such a thin shared understanding or, if
one exists, that it can do the work he would ask of it. 132
Shapiro is thus left with the following response to the difficulty that
theoretical disagreements pose for his theory: “a theory of law should account for
the intelligibility of theoretical disagreements, not necessarily provide a resolution
to them.” 133 But this argument will not do. Shapiro acknowledges that legal
positivists do not make disagreement intelligible when they provide no means for
identifying which social facts matter in determining the content of the law. 134 As
Shapiro notes, Dworkin exploits this point by arguing that in various cases
interpreters disagree about the grounds for resolving disputes about the content of
129

DWORKIN, supra note 126, at 405.
Positivists thus can speculate about a consensus at ever-greater levels of generality,
but they provide little reason to believe such a consensus actually exists. Jules L. Coleman,
in defending legal positivism, pursues an analogous argument by moving beyond
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of this strategy, labeling it the retreat to abstraction, see Davis, supra note 87, at 5–6, 9–10.
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Shapiro briefly suggests that such a thin shared understanding rules out, for
example, Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity because it is inconsistent with the economy
of trust. Id. He further indicates a thin shared understanding may support an argument
Jeremy Waldron has made for reliance on textualism rather than on purposivism in the face
of deep disagreements about principles. Id. But Shapiro is unpersuasive regarding
Dworkin. As discussed below, infra Part IV.C, Dworkin’s theory—or a natural law theory
similar to Dworkin’s—can be applied in a way that accommodates doubts about the good
faith and competence of legal interpreters. As to Waldron’s argument, Shapiro himself
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the law—that is, they disagree about which social facts determine legal content,
such as whether the plain text of a statute should always be conclusive or whether
it should be set aside when it would produce absurd results. 135 Shapiro does not
deny the force of this point, but claims he has solved the problem by relying on the
perspectives of the planners. He claims their views on various issues—including
on the economy of trust—dictate the grounds for resolving theoretical disputes. 136
As noted above, however, social facts do not suffice to identify the views of
the planners. As Shapiro acknowledges, issues of political legitimacy and
substantive justice inform who counts as planners, which of their views matter, and
whether they should be shown deference. 137 That is the consequence, for example,
of his distinction between authority systems and opportunistic systems. Shapiro
has not avoided the need to resolve moral issues to determine which social facts
are relevant to legal interpretation. He has just substituted one set of moral issues
for another—from moral views about how to interpret a statute, for example, to
moral views about which views of which planners of a legal system deserve
deference in deciding how to interpret a statute. If the necessity of making the
former moral judgments renders legal positivism unintelligible, the same is true
regarding the latter moral judgments.
In sum, Shapiro does not offer a satisfactory way to resolve theoretical
disagreements with recourse only to social facts. The social facts he identifies as
candidates to perform this function themselves give rise to controversy,
implicating additional moral facts. Shapiro can attempt to address this problem by
turning to ever more abstract social facts—addressing disagreements about legal
interpretation by turning to social facts about metainterpretation and, when that
fails, to social facts about meta-metainterpretation, and so on. 138 But there is no
reason to think Shapiro can thereby solve the problem rather than simply re-create
it.
Theoretical disagreements thus pose a formidable challenge to Shapiro’s
argument for legal positivism. 139 They suggest why moral judgment will often be
135

Id. at 287–89.
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Again, this point follows from Shapiro’s treatment of authority and opportunistic
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necessary to produce determinate results in legal interpretation. And because moral
issues lie at the foundation of efforts to specify the content of the law, the
challenge arises for all forms of legal positivism, even inclusive legal positivism.
When the law serves as a source of moral guidance, it seems the content of the law
depends ultimately not only on social facts, but also on moral facts.
C. Ptolemaic Positivism 140
Theoretical disagreements do not pose the only challenge to Shapiro’s defense
of legal positivism. There is also a risk that in attempting to divorce moral
judgments from legal interpretation, Shapiro will be forced to devise a tortured
description of the nature of legal reasoning. Indeed, Shapiro himself recognizes at
one point that his argument could appear Ptolemaic—that his account of legal
reasoning could seem as artificial as efforts to provide a model of the solar system
in which the sun orbits around the earth. 141
Shapiro has good reason to worry. In ordinary legal practice, many judges
routinely make value judgments and, in doing so, reach conclusions that they label
as “the law.” 142 Shapiro’s embrace of exclusive legal positivism requires him to
deny the apparently pervasive role of moral facts in legal reasoning. 143
Shapiro responds in part by defining the law and legal reasoning as not
including moral judgments. 144 Unlike his approach to theoretical disagreements,
this effort is, in a sense, successful. If, by definition, law and legal reasoning do not
include moral judgments, then exclusive legal positivism is right. But this
approach requires a strange and counterintuitive understanding of law and legal
reasoning. That is a strike against it. 145

the nature of law. Shapiro comes awfully close to this position in asserting that law by its
nature has a moral aim. See, e.g., id. at 213–17. For a concern about this issue, see Gardner
& Macklem, supra note 122.
140
I borrow the phrase “Ptolemaic Positivism” from a heading in DWORKIN, JUSTICE
IN ROBES, supra note 63, at 198–211, both because there are parallels between my critique
of Shapiro’s exclusive legal positivism and Dworkin’s critique of Joseph Raz’s exclusive
legal positivism, and because Shapiro recognizes the risk that his views could appear
Ptolemaic. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 278.
141
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 278 (“Like Ptolemaic astronomy, the Planning Theory
must add epicycle upon epicycle to save the doctrine from incoherence.”). To be sure,
Shapiro denies that his theory is in fact Ptolemaic. Id.
142
Note that inclusive legal positivism can accommodate this role for morality in
legal interpretation. It requires only that the role of morality depends on social facts, i.e.,
facts about the practice of law dictate when moral judgments are relevant.
143
Jules L. Coleman identifies this point as supporting inclusive legal positivism and
undermining exclusive legal positivism, although he suggests it is not conclusive. Coleman,
supra note 63, at 56–57.
144
See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 272.
145
Coleman, supra note 63, at 56–57.
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Recall the various ways in which judges appear to rely on morality in making
the law determinate. 146 They make moral judgments in applying certain legal
standards (e.g., unreasonableness and unconscionability), in applying rules in
difficult cases, in formulating legal rules, in choosing between legal rules, in
selecting an appropriate interpretive methodology, and so on. In all of these
undertakings, judges often take recourse to the purposes behind the relevant law,
and their efforts to identify and weigh those purposes involve recourse both to
social facts (e.g., what did a legislature or past judge have in mind regarding the
content or scope of a legal rule?) and moral facts (e.g., what does the current judge
think are the most compelling purposes a legal rule might serve?). Indeed, unlike
some other positivists, Shapiro believes that purposivism offers a legitimate way of
specifying the content of the law. 147
Shapiro deploys a complicated strategy for dealing with this problem. He
distinguishes, for example, between applying the law and making the law 148 and
between interpreting the law and adjudicating disputes. 149 As to the first point,
according to Shapiro, judges apply the law only when they are able to reach
determinate conclusions without exercising moral judgment. 150 If judges must
make moral judgments as a result of inconsistencies, ambiguities, or gaps in the
authoritative sources of law, they are making new law. 151 Morality, then, is not
required to say what existing law is.
Similarly, regarding the distinction between adjudication and interpretation,
Shapiro suggests adjudication may require a judge to exercise moral judgment, but
that exercise is not itself a part of the law. 152 So, for example, a dispute about the
enforceability of a damages provision in a contract may depend on whether it is
unreasonable or unconscionable. 153 If a judge has to make a moral judgment in
applying the relevant standard—in deciding whether the damages provision is
unreasonable or unconscionable—the moral judgment itself is not part of the
law. 154
Shapiro’s strategy gives rise to a welter of difficulties. Indeterminacy is a
matter of degree, not kind. If any exercise of moral judgment in legal interpretation
renders the law indeterminate—even just a judgment about whether the law in a
146

See supra Part III.A–B.
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 252–54 (embracing purposivism in legal interpretation
and questioning H.L.A. Hart’s apparent rejection of it).
148
Id. at 274.
149
Id. at 276.
150
Id. at 274, 276.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 276.
153
Id.
154
Id. Shapiro relies in part on analogies to support this argument. Borrowing from
Joseph Raz, he claims that foreign law, for example, may be relevant to adjudication in
America, as may be the rules of English grammar, but, he reasons, that does not mean that
foreign law or English grammar is part of American law. He suggests the same can be said
about morality. Id. at 272.
147
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particular area is reasonable and should be applied in a straightforward way—
Shapiro’s approach might not recognize much law at all, at least not in litigated
cases. 155 Although Shapiro at times writes as if legal determinacy is binary—the
law is either determinate or indeterminate—in reality determinacy almost certainly
forms a continuum. 156 The law is rarely perfectly determinate without value
judgments, even if it is also rarely completely indeterminate. 157
Moreover, drawing the line between determinate and indeterminate cases
would be no mean feat. Judges make implicit moral judgments all the time. It may
be possible in theory to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive judgments
about the purposes of a law or the best interpretive methodology, but it is almost
certainly not possible in practice. 158
So if anything turns on whether a judge can specify the content of the law
purely through social facts or must rely on moral facts—if that dictates whether the
judge is finding or making the law, how the judge should go about doing her job,
or whether the law has moral legitimacy—the resulting difficulties would be
profound.
Of course, in the world of legal practice, these distinctions do not ordinarily
matter. Judges, for example, generally do not recognize a shift in interpretive
methodology depending on the degree of determinacy in the law. They tend to use
the same interpretive techniques in easy cases as in hard ones. 159 Nor, for the most
155

This position assumes that the legal realists were right about room for
disagreement about how best to interpret the law in most litigated cases. See LEITER, supra
note 36, at 19–21 (discussing this realist claim).
156
Contrast Shapiro’s acknowledgment that legality is likely a matter of degree.
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 223–24.
157
Note Shapiro’s account of legal interpretation as involving merely an inquiry into
social fact seems inconsistent with the views of prominent judges. Holmes, for example,
recognized legal interpretation as a messier and more complex exercise in judgment:
“Behind the logical form [of law] lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of
competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true,
and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). Judge Richard Posner has similarly
acknowledged the way in which values inform views on facts. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK 116 (2008) (“[T]he empirical claims made in judicial proceedings—for
example, claims concerning the deterrent effect of capital punishment or the risk to national
security of allowing suspected terrorists to obtain habeas corpus—are often unverified. So
judges fall back on their intuitions . . . .”). The same would seem to hold true for the kinds
of social facts Shapiro claims are relevant to giving content to the law.
158
See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is
impossible for judges to make ‘factual findings’ without inserting their own policy
judgments, when the factual findings are policy judgments . . . .”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175–76 (1921) (discussing many influences on
legal interpretation, including the subconscious).
159
Of course, this is not always true. Shapiro discusses, for example, a case in which
the plain text of a statute would yield an absurd result. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 287–88
(discussing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)). Some judges similarly say
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part, are they apt to perceive their obligation to follow the law as depending on
how mechanical legal interpretation is.
And these criticisms also may not have practical consequences if Shapiro’s
theory seeks not to inform how legal interpreters should act but merely to offer an
outsider’s description—however artificial—of legal practice, one that legal
practitioners may find odd or unfamiliar but that is not designed to guide their
actions in any case.
However, if Shapiro’s theory of the law is supposed to influence what
interpreters of the law should do—and Shapiro says it is 160—then the problems he
faces are significant. His position may be that judges should proceed differently in
cases of legal indeterminacy than in cases of legal determinacy. If so, he must
address at least two challenges: first, how judges can meaningfully distinguish
between the two and, second, how they should reason in indeterminate cases.
As to the latter, Shapiro needs a theory for how judges should go about their
work in cases of indeterminacy, one that he does not adequately provide. Nor does
existing law cast much light on this issue. It is true that judges sometimes
recognize they are addressing an issue of “first impression.” But Shapiro’s
approach would have far broader application. The number of cases in which judges
rely at least in part on their own moral judgment is surely at least an order of
magnitude greater than the number in which they indicate they are making new
law. Moreover, even in cases where courts recognize existing law as insufficient to
yield a clear result, as noted above, they tend to use the same interpretive tools as
in ordinary cases—reasoning by analogy to precedent, looking to the purposes of
the law, and the like. Any new interpretive methodology in these situations would
involve a break with ordinary practice that Shapiro does not adequately develop in
Legality. 161
Alternatively, if according to Shapiro’s theory judges should proceed in much
the same manner whether they are finding the law or making the law, he does not
adequately explain why. This shortfall applies not only to the issue of how judges
should go about deciding legal issues and cases, but also to why they may use
coercive force in applying new law (assuming at times they may legitimately do

that they apply the plain text of a statute unless it is ambiguous and then treat legal
interpretation as a multiple step process, beginning with a determination of whether the text
is ambiguous and proceeding from there. But a great deal of legal interpretation operates
otherwise. Judges consider the relevant text, the broader legal scheme, the purposes of the
law, relevant case law, and the like, and render an overall judgment. They tend to follow
this methodology regardless of how certain they are about the proper legal interpretation in
a case.
160
Id. at 22–25, 30–32.
161
Shapiro recognizes that H.L.A. Hart contemplated a sharp break in judicial
methodology between cases in which the law is determinate and cases in which it is not. Id.
at 255. Shapiro does not make clear his own position on the matter.
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so). The reason judges should—or may—apply new law retroactively is not at all
obvious. 162
None of this is to say Shapiro cannot address all of these issues. To the
contrary, in theory he can accommodate all of them in one way or another, just as
in theory a model of the solar system is possible in which the sun orbits the earth—
provided, of course, one is willing to add epicycle on top of epicycle. As noted
above, Shapiro at one point acknowledges that his attempt to separate law from
morality may appear Ptolemaic in this way. 163 He claims, however, that such a
charge is unfounded because the complexities are a natural consequence of his
theory. 164 But that is an admission, not a rejoinder. What makes a theory Ptolemaic
is that the difficulties of matching it to the real world follow naturally from the
theory. A defense of the theory involves showing it offers natural solutions to
those difficulties. But Shapiro’s efforts to reconcile ordinary legal practice with
legal positivism seem ad hoc. Further, he has left many difficult issues unresolved,
difficult issues that would likely require him to suggest various counterintuitive
ways of understanding what counts as the law. His Planning Theory, in other
words, creates significant problems to which it does not offer straightforward
solutions, a mark of Ptolemaism.
Moreover, whether the difficulties discussed above are a natural consequence
of Shapiro’s theory depends on how one identifies that theory. If his theory is
exclusive legal positivism, Shapiro must indeed attempt to maintain a strong
separation between law and morality. But if his primary commitment is to the
Planning Theory, he need not accept exclusive legal positivism in particular or
legal positivism in general.
D. The Logic of Planning
Shapiro’s Planning Theory makes a major contribution to jurisprudence. He
contends that it entails a commitment to exclusive legal positivism. If so, that
would support his embrace of positivism. But Shapiro is not correct that the
Planning Theory logically requires a commitment to positivism. Nor does he offer
a compelling case that planning, as a matter of policy, requires elimination of all
moral judgments in interpreting the law.
Recall Shapiro’s Logic of Planning: the purpose of a plan is to resolve moral
conflicts; if application of the plan requires consideration of the very issues the
plan means to resolve, then the plan fails. 165 Shapiro suggests that this logic
precludes reliance on any moral judgments in identifying the content of the law.
After all, he reasons, the point of a plan is “to settle matters about what morality
162

To be sure, there are limited exceptions to the general practice of applying new
interpretations retroactively, such as some forms of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 199 (2001) (applying qualified immunity because alleged
constitutional right violation was not clearly established).
163
See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 278.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 275, 278, 302.
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requires.” 166 Legal interpreters, he concludes, must identify the content of the law
by recourse only to social facts, not to moral facts. 167
But Shapiro does not fully succeed in supporting this position because he does
not adequately develop his account of the role moral judgments play in the
circumstances of legality. His position rests, at least implicitly, on two
propositions: (1) permitting any moral judgment in legal interpretation would
render planning useless; and (2) reliance on social facts poses no similar threat to
law as a plan. Neither proposition is true merely as a matter of logic. And both are
contestable as a matter of policy.
As to the first point, it is not correct that planning precludes moral judgment
in legal interpretation. Planning merely requires reasonable predictability, not
absolute certainty. Even assuming that moral judgments are responsible for the
circumstances of legality and that the point of the law as a plan is to confine those
moral disagreements, the law could do so by framing moral issues in a narrow way
or by creating a presumption about how they should be resolved. A plan can work
even if participants revisit the matters it addresses, provided they do so with
sufficient deference to give it stability.
Second, at least in some circumstances, social facts may give rise to
disagreements and moral facts may command a consensus. Law as a plan may
function better if it sometimes allows (or requires) legal interpreters to rely on
moral facts in saying what the law is and prevents them (or discourages them) from
making judgments about at least some social facts.
1. Planning Need Not Eliminate Any Moral Judgments
The first problem with Shapiro’s reliance on the logic of planning is that it is
too rigid. All that planning requires—as a logical matter—is significant stability.
Shapiro himself suggests that plans need be only “fairly stable, which is to say that
they must be reasonably resistant to reconsideration.” 168 Participants in a plan need
not refrain from making value judgments, not even regarding issues the plan
addresses. A plan can work if, for example, participants show great deference to
the value judgments a plan instantiates.
This point becomes apparent from an analogy that Shapiro offers. He asks
readers to imagine hiring a financial advisor to develop an investment plan. 169 He
then claims that if we lack the competence to create this plan ourselves, it would be
irrational for us to revisit the merits of the very investment decisions we hired the

166

Id. at 275.
Id.
168
Id. at 124.
169
Id. at 332.
167
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advisor to make. 170 After all, he reasons, our examination of the merits would
defeat the purpose of hiring the advisor in the first place. 171
But Shapiro’s analysis is unpersuasive as a matter of logic and questionable as
a matter of judgment. We could certainly take a quick look at each proposed
investment and consider its merits, perhaps in a perfunctory manner unless our
initial investigation leads us to think the advisor may have made an egregious
error. Such limited reliance on the advisor could well save us considerable time
and greatly improve the quality of our decision making, even if it does not
eliminate our consideration of the merits of any of the investments. Nothing about
this strategy is illogical or necessarily unwise.
The same may be true for law as a plan. The purpose of law as a plan may be
merely to narrow or frame moral issues, or to offer a default resolution,
nonetheless deliberately incorporating—as part of the plan—that participants
exercise some moral judgment on all issues. Shapiro comes very close to
acknowledging this point. 172 He writes:
To serve as a plan, we might say, it is not necessary for a law to
eliminate moral reasoning. Rather, it need only displace the need for
some such deliberation. As long as it takes certain issues “off the table”
and channels deliberation in a particular direction, the rule will fulfill its
function as a plan. 173
Given Shapiro’s concession that the law as a plan need not eliminate moral
reasoning, his position is somewhat arbitrary that moral reasoning can play no role
in saying what the law is. 174 Moreover, he does not consider that a plan need not
take any issues entirely “off the table” but rather may just facilitate their resolution.
As long as the plan constrains judgment, expedites analysis, and enhances
coordination, it can help to address the circumstances of legality. It can serve as a
corrective to deficiencies in other forms of decision making. 175
170

Id. at 124, 333.
Id. Shapiro acknowledges that an investment plan may place significant discretion
in its beneficiary. Id. at 334–35. Note the analogy suggests the law, even as a plan, could
vest discretion in interpreters to make moral judgments in saying what the law is.
172
See id. at 276.
173
Id.
174
To be clear, in the quotation Shapiro is arguing that the law as a plan can work as
long as identifying the content of the law does not require moral judgment, even if its
application does. My point is that confining moral judgment to the application of the law is
arbitrary.
175
Indeed, Shapiro recognizes the compatibility of moral judgment and the
implementation of law as a plan. He explains the moral judgment necessary to decide
whether a contract is unconscionable: “Judges who follow such a rule . . . will not engage
in unrestricted moral deliberation: they will focus on the issue of unconscionability, ask
themselves whether the contract in their case is unconscionable, and refuse to enforce those
contracts that they deem to be so.” SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 276.
171
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Shapiro attempts to address the possibility of revisiting plans with the concept
of defeasibility. 176 He recognizes that we may choose not to abide by a plan. But
he seeks to relegate this possibility to the margins, suggesting we would defeat the
purpose of a plan if we were to revisit the decisions we made other than as a result
of a change in circumstances or for some other extraordinary reason. 177 Discussing
reconsideration of a relatively modest plan—to cook dinner at home rather than eat
out—he concludes, “I did not derive any benefit from my earlier planning, for I
ended up engaging in the same thought processes that I followed earlier.” 178
Again, Shapiro’s conclusion does not follow logically. Revisiting an issue
does not necessarily mean analyzing it in just the same way. An earlier partial
commitment may greatly simplify and expedite later consideration. The thought
processes are not necessarily the same, even if the issues under consideration are.
By giving deference to past judgments—our own or those of others—we could
benefit greatly from earlier planning even if we do not entirely rule out attention to
any judgments in advance. 179
2. Planning Need Not Eliminate All Moral Judgments
But even if Shapiro were right that the law as a plan must eliminate some
moral judgments—that it would defeat the purpose of a plan for interpreters to
revisit the moral judgments a plan attempts to resolve—that would not suffice to
support his view that the Planning Theory entails exclusive legal positivism. The
law might resolve some moral judgments—perhaps particularly controversial
moral judgments—but leave others open to be filled in as part of the plan. 180
Interpreters might then need to resolve moral issues in saying what the law is.
Shapiro thus needs to make a further argument about the incompatibility of
planning and moral judgments.
Shapiro suggests such an argument by distinguishing moral facts from social
facts. He claims social facts are objectively knowable in a way that moral facts are
not:
Because the existence or content of the law can be determined only by
social facts, there is no danger that the process of legal discovery will
176

See, e.g., id. at 124, 183, 303.
Id. at 124 (“It would defeat the purpose of having plans if I were to review their
wisdom without an otherwise compelling reason to do so.”).
178
Id.
179
Shapiro could, of course, make a normative argument—rather than a purely logical
argument—that law as a plan should include little, if any, revisiting. Whether he could
defend that claim about law in all circumstances is not clear. In any case, as discussed
below, see infra Part VI.A, such a normative argument is not available to Shapiro as he has
structured his position. He thus attempts to limit himself to logic to support his position.
180
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 120–22 (discussing “The Partiality of Plans”); see also
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 17 (1987) (noting
plans may contain room for further decision making).
177
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defeat the very purpose of having law. Social facts are determined
through empirical observation, not moral deliberation. As such, they are
fitting grounds for law. 181
But judgments about moral facts and social facts do not divide neatly in the
way Shapiro suggests. Interpreters do not in fact discover social facts simply by
empirical observation, as Shapiro claims. Their values inform their views of social
facts. 182 More important for purposes of planning, although related, legal
interpreters may disagree about key social facts and may agree about equally key
moral facts. Under such circumstances, the law might best facilitate planning by
encouraging legal interpreters to rely on moral facts rather than social facts.
In overlooking these points, Shapiro makes a kind of category mistake. Plans
are eminently practical. They are instruments: a means for achieving ends. It does
not matter what in theory participants in the plan could know. To the extent a plan
is concerned with coordinating behavior, for example, what matters is whether the
participants will in practice converge on a common perspective. The participants
may, as a practical matter, reach predictable, common conclusions on some
appropriately framed moral issues. Alternatively, they may reach conflicting views
regarding some social facts. 183
Consider school segregation. Today there is little doubt that the overwhelming
majority of judges would reach the same conclusions on at least some issues if
permitted to take into account moral facts. They would, for example, hold that a
law creating whites-only schools would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 184
181

SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 275.
See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I
am saying that it is impossible for judges to make ‘factual findings’ without inserting their
own policy judgments, when the factual findings are policy judgments.”); Dan M. Kahan,
Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional
Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–26 (2011) (discussing ways in which our ends or goals can
shape how we view facts).
183
Supreme Court Justices routinely rely on—and disagree about—social facts in
interpreting the law, often without input from the parties and, indeed, without a sound
empirical basis for doing so. See generally Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court
Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012) (discussing “in-house” fact finding by the Court,
that is, fact finding not based on evidence submitted by the parties). Larsen notes that 56%
of the most salient Supreme Court decisions in the last ten years contain facts based on inhouse research. Id. at 1262. She proposes alternative procedures to the current in-house fact
finding. Id. at 1305–12. In reality, however, the tendency toward motivated thinking
suggests a change in process is likely to have at most a modest impact on whether judges
will see social facts the way they want to see them. See Kahan, supra note 182, at 19–26.
184
There are two standard readings of Equal Protection: (1) it prohibits classification
based on race and (2) it prohibits subordination based on race. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1470–73 (2004). These two readings converge in this
instance. Id. at 1476–77. To be sure, other issues would be more controversial, including
182
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But the same is not true if judges were to take an originalist view, relying on
the perspective of the planners of the amendment. Disagreements would arise
about whose original perspective might govern, whether segregated schools were
originally understood to violate equal protection, and how the relevant issue should
be framed. 185
The problem of segregated schools illustrates that, as a practical matter,
reliance on moral facts may at times yield a greater consensus than reliance on
social facts. In some contexts reliance on moral facts may be more conducive to
planning and, crucially, the moral facts may displace controversial social facts,
ultimately improving coordination.
Moreover, as recent empirical work shows, a strong correlation exists
between views on moral facts and social facts. 186 In practice the two tend to be
inextricably intertwined. One strongly suspects, for example, that modern
originalists’ assessments of the relevant social facts regarding school desegregation
are informed by their desire to conclude that Brown v. Board of Education was
rightly decided. 187 Our views on moral facts shape our views on social facts. So if
any consideration of moral facts defeated planning—if moral judgments were
fatally infectious in this way—interpreting law as a plan would be difficult, if not
impossible. 188 But it is not. We need not worry about the permeable barrier
between moral facts and social facts because planning does not require a
categorical rejection of reliance on either one.
3. Shapiro’s Effort to Separate Moral Judgment from Legal Interpretation Is
Arbitrary
Indeed, Shapiro’s own account of adjudication reveals that planning can
function reasonably well even if a plan requires participants to make moral
judgments. Recall that Shapiro defines the law as including only judgments by
legal interpreters about social facts, not judgments about morality. He recognizes,
the constitutionality of taking race into account to create integrated schools. See, e.g.,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (addressing
affirmative action in public schools). But the point is that sometimes moral facts are less
controversial than social facts, not that they always are.
185
See generally Derek A. Webb, Getting Right with Brown: How Originalist
Supreme Court Nominees Defend Brown v. Board of Education, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
563 (2011).
186
See supra note 183.
187
See Webb, supra note 185, at 564–65 (discussing literature claiming Brown cannot
be reconciled with originalism and efforts by originalist judicial nominees to take the
contrary position).
188
Supreme Court Justices—and no doubt other judges—routinely rely on their views
of social facts in deciding cases, social facts that lack any basis in the record, that are not
subjected to the crucible of the adversarial process, and that often have little, if any,
empirical support. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 183, at 1290–1305. Reliance on social facts
thus creates the risk that judges will rely—consciously or otherwise—on their preferred
view of the world in rendering decisions, including on their value judgments.
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however, that in adjudication, judges often may—even must—make moral
judgments to resolve particular cases. 189
But what matters for contending with the circumstances of legality are the
ultimate conclusions reached by judges or others about how to act. Participants in a
legal system want to know how judges will ultimately rule, not how they will
specify the content of the law as only one step in their decision making process. If
our legal system is a kind of plan and if morality plays a role in adjudication in the
ways that Shapiro admits, then the success of our legal system in contending with
the circumstances of legality establishes that Shapiro is wrong about the logic of
planning. Law as a plan can tolerate a role for moral judgment, as the realities of
adjudication establish. Shapiro’s account of adjudication shows that moral
judgments need not be hermetically sealed off from planning through the law.
Planning and moral judgment can comfortably coexist.
The same point applies to when, if at all, judges have a moral obligation to
follow the law. Shapiro does not address this issue, attempting to separate it from
determining the content of the law. 190 But judges and other legal interpreters
seeking to fulfill their moral obligations must decide whether they should abide by
the law. Shapiro does not deny that this inquiry requires moral judgment. Indeed,
his acceptance of Hume’s Law implies such a requirement. 191 Yet he does not
adequately contend with its implications.
Consider as a first possibility that the law never has moral legitimacy. If not,
it is hard to see how the law can be an effective plan. It sets up a system of
coordination that no one should follow.
An alternative possibility is that the law at least sometimes has moral
legitimacy. At first glance, this alternative appears more attractive for Shapiro.
Law as a plan may sometimes have utility if it sometimes commands moral
allegiance. But this possibility creates its own difficulties. Shapiro must explain
how successful planning can accommodate the kind of moral judgment necessary
to determine when the law creates moral obligations. He can do so but only, it
would seem, by acknowledging the logic of planning does not require legal
interpreters to refrain from assessing moral facts.
Shapiro offers no compelling reason why the full decision making apparatus
necessary to legal interpretation—including the decision whether the law has moral
legitimacy—could not fit in a plan and could not be called the law. Let us further
assume—as Shapiro does—that judges must at times exercise moral judgment in
particular cases, e.g., in deciding whether to follow the law as a plan in a particular
case, in applying the plan to the extent it calls for moral judgment, and so on. 192
Let us also assume—again, as Shapiro does—that whether a judge has a moral

189

See supra notes 141–147 and accompanying text.
See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 188.
191
Hume’s Law holds that one can derive an “ought” only from an “ought.” Id. at 47.
192
See supra notes 141–147 and accompanying text.
190
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obligation to follow the law turns in part on moral judgments. 193 What—other than
Shapiro’s definition of the law as a special kind of plan that does not allow
consideration of moral facts—prevents us from characterizing the plan as including
those moral facts necessary at times to decide what a judge should do? Such a plan
would not necessarily be useless. Judgments about some moral facts may impose
no greater encumbrance on planning than judgments about some social facts. In
some areas, properly defined moral judgments may even enhance the efficacy of
the plan, including better coordinating behavior.
In sum, the logic of planning does not require exclusive legal positivism or
even inclusive legal positivism. Shapiro confirms this point at least implicitly by
recognizing that our system for resolving legal disputes functions reasonably well
even though adjudication at times involves consideration of moral facts—indeed,
at times, even the very moral facts that the law aspires to settle.
IV. DUALITY
Shapiro’s Planning Theory, then, does not and need not reconcile legal
positivism with Hume’s Law, at least not in the sort of complex legal systems that
exist in the United States and many other jurisdictions. That does not necessarily
mean the triumph of natural law. Natural law still faces the daunting task of
contending with Evil Law, as well as with various arguments that Shapiro makes
over the course of Legality. Perhaps jurisprudence remains stuck where it was
before Shapiro weighed in—with imperfect options. But there is another way
forward. Shapiro assumes the law is monistic. That explains his contention that
positivism fails if it cannot account for Hume’s Law and natural law fails if it
cannot account for Evil Law. This Article proposes an alternative, a dualism that
accommodates key challenges Shapiro identifies for both legal positivism and
natural law.
A. Dualism About the Nature of Law
As Shapiro recognizes, a main difficulty for legal positivism lies in providing
an account of the nature of law when it gives rise to moral obligations. Legal
positivism then struggles to explain how legal interpretation can proceed without
moral judgment. On the other hand, a primary challenge for natural law is to offer
an understanding of the nature of law when it lacks moral legitimacy. Evil Law
appears to leave no room for moral judgment. Shapiro indicates skepticism that
anyone else has solved this dilemma. 194 But his own effort also proves
193

This point follows from Shapiro’s acknowledgement of Hume’s Law, which
requires a moral input to produce a moral output. Shapiro claims to abide by Hume’s Law.
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 188.
194
Shapiro makes extended arguments about how past positivists have failed to do so.
See, e.g., id. at 51–117 (critiquing the theories of John Austin and H.L.A. Hart). For an
interesting argument that Shapiro is unpersuasive in particular in criticizing H.L.A. Hart
see Gardner & Macklem, supra note 122. Gardner and Macklem suggest that Dworkin’s
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unsuccessful. So should we accept legal positivism despite Hume’s Law or natural
law despite Evil Law? The choice may be a false one. It overlooks a third option.
Shapiro’s insight about core challenges to legal positivism and natural law
suggests a possible natural boundary in the jurisprudential landscape. Natural law
may provide the best account of law when it imposes moral obligations and legal
positivism when it does not. The content of the law may vary depending on which
of these approaches is appropriate for a particular act of legal interpretation.
Shapiro suggests an analogous possibility at one point. He recognizes that
different legal interpreters within a system may understand the law as having
different content. 195 At first, this conclusion may be surprising. But upon reflection
it makes sense. Different legal interpreters—by virtue of their roles within the legal
system—should use different interpretive methodologies. Courts, for example,
should at times show deference to administrative agencies. 196 If the differences in
the interpretive methodologies are meaningful, sometimes they will produce
different views of the content of the law. Perspective matters. 197
A similar analysis can apply to the nature of law. Perhaps law does not have
the same nature for all purposes. The question then arises whether Shapiro’s
philosophical methodology can tolerate this view. Drawing reasonable inferences,
it would seem that his approach would permit two (or more) complementary
understandings of the nature of law.
Recall that Shapiro characterizes his approach as “conceptual analysis.”198 He
indicates that it involves taking all of the “truisms” 199 about a concept—“the set of
statements that strike informed individuals as self-evidently true . . . .” 200—and
attempting to account for them. Of course, he recognizes the possibility that
different people do not share a single concept. Two people use the word “bank” to
signify different concepts, for example, when one person understands it to mean a
financial institution and another person understands it to mean the slope of land
alongside a river. 201 According to Shapiro, however, not all disagreements reduce
to the use of different concepts. Sometimes investigation of the collection of our
intuitions about a concept can lead to revisions in our views. Shapiro explains:

argument based on indeterminacy is “more testing” than Shapiro’s. Id. For the reasons set
forth in the text, I agree.
195
See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 358.
196
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
197
Shapiro notes another way in which perspective informs legal interpretation.
Relying on the work of Donald Davidson, he suggests that legal requirements depend on
the description of the actions at issue. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 278. Different descriptions
of actions can lead to different conclusions about legal entailments.
198
Id. at 17–22.
199
Id. at 13.
200
Id. at 16.
201
Id. at 17.
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While conceptual analysis proceeds on the basis of our intuition, it is
obviously important that we not take any of our reactions as sacrosanct
and unrevisable. The fact that an account does not square with some of
our intuitions—that it requires us, say, to deny that the Nazis had law—
may count against that account but it is by no means fatal to it. We must
consider the totality of our reactions and be willing to give up some of
our views when they don’t cohere with other judgments to which we
assign a higher priority and are therefore less willing to abandon. 202
To be sure, one might question the methodology Shapiro calls conceptual
analysis. 203 But even within his approach, there would seem to be room to
relinquish the view—which Shapiro adopts at least implicitly—that law has a
single nature for all purposes. When we speak of the law, we may be inadvertently
employing a kind of polysemy—using the term “law” to talk about two different
things, not just one thing, even though the two things have a significant overlap. 204
The sociologist or historian who seeks only to describe the law may use that term
in a different way than a judge who generally has a moral obligation to abide by it.
The law as a social institution viewed by an outside observer—viewed from what
one might call an “external perspective”—may not be precisely the same thing as
the law viewed by an internal participant morally bound by the law—from what
one might call an “internal perspective” 205 —even though many of the same
considerations will figure in identifying the content of the law either way.
202

Id.
See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 36, at 219.
204
See Andrei Marmor, Varieties of Vagueness in the Law 8 (Univ. S. Cal. Gould
Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-8, 2012), available at ssrn.com/abstract
=2039076 (discussing polysemy). Marmor offers as an example of polysemy three uses of
the word “window”:
203

(1a) “I broke the window” (the window’s glass)
(1b) “I opened the window” (the window’s inner frame with the glass)
(1c) “I entered through the window” (the window’s outer frame)
Id. at 7. Each use of the word “law,” to borrow Marmor’s phrasing, may similarly entail
only “a particular subset of the definite extension” of the term. Id. at 8–9.
205
The contrast here between external and internal perspectives on the law does not
correspond precisely to how others have used the terms. I am persuaded by Shapiro, for
example, that H.L.A. Hart understood the internal point of view more broadly than I define
it. See Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157,
1157 (2006) (“The internal point of view is the practical attitude of rule acceptance—it
does not imply that people who accept the rules accept their moral legitimacy, only that
they are disposed to guide and evaluate conduct in accordance with the rules.”). I believe
Shapiro adopts an approach similar to H.L.A. Hart’s. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 183. I
nevertheless use the definitions in the text because I believe treating the internal
perspective as limited to those who have a moral obligation to follow the law can allow for
a clear understanding of when legal positivism and natural law each provides the best
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The incentive to shift our understanding of the nature of law in this way is
great. The main challenges Shapiro identifies to legal positivism and natural law
then simply dissolve. Evil Law would not pose an obstacle to natural law, no more
than Hume’s Law would to legal positivism. Each account of the nature of law
would work within its own domain.
Of course, there is a cost to abandoning monism about the nature of law. It
runs afoul of the principle of Occam’s Razor. But at some point parsimony comes
at too high a price. 206 The battle between natural law and legal positivism has
grown old. Its modern incarnation has been raging for almost two centuries. 207
True, at times one side has declared victory—Ronald Dworkin, for example,
claims his arguments have defeated those in favor of legal positivism, 208 and Brian
Leiter asserts that the proponents of legal positivism have overcome the criticisms
of Ronald Dworkin. 209 But Dworkin is preoccupied with the law as a source of
moral guidance 210 and Leiter with a purely descriptive or predictive account of the
law. 211 The debate has matured without a satisfying resolution. It may be time to
explore a two-state solution with natural law and legal positivism each assigned to
its appropriate terrain. 212
B. The Bad Man v. the Good Man
In Legality, Shapiro does not address directly the possibility of dualism about
the nature of law. But he does at one point reason in a way that raises a challenge
account of the nature of the law. My hope is that this benefit outweighs any confusion that
may occur regarding semantics.
206
Leiter makes this point about the potential tradeoff between consilience and
simplicity. LEITER, supra note 36, at 211. Leiter applies the point in the context of his
naturalism, so that his definition of consilience might not embrace the argument made in
the text. Still, I think the epistemic values he identifies have application in this setting. In
other words, it is a virtue of dualism if it allows us to make not only descriptive and
predictive claims about the law but prescriptive ones as well.
207
Dworkin, for example, attributes to Bentham the first systematic version of legal
positivism. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 63, at 211 (citing JEREMY
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823)).
208
See id. at 211–16.
209
See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 36, at 153–81.
210
Dworkin, for example, does not reject sociological and taxonomic positivism; he
simply denies that they have philosophical importance. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra
note 63, at 27.
211
Leiter attributes a “normative quietism” to Legal Realists and seems content
himself to offer only a predictive or descriptive theory of the nature of law. See, e.g.,
LEITER, supra note 36, at 63 n.18, 190–91, 275.
212
This proposal implicates but leaves unaddressed underlying philosophical issues,
including the ontological and epistemological implications of legal dualism. It is unclear,
for example, the extent to which legal dualism casts in doubt—or requires a rejection of—
the traditional scientific naturalism of, say, Brian Leiter in Naturalizing Jurisprudence. See
generally LEITER, supra note 36.
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for legal dualism. In an instructive passage, he suggests that the law must be
knowable in the same way to Holmes’s proverbial bad man 213 as it is to a good
man: 214
The bad man not only can talk the talk; he can think the thought. He
too can “think like a lawyer.” Legal reasoning, we might say, is a
remarkably open process. Even those who judge the law morally
illegitimate, or reject it for self-interested reasons, can figure out what
the law demands of them. Indeed, it would be bizarre if the only people
who could understand the law were those who accepted it. The law
claims the right to demand compliance from everyone, even those who
reject its demands. 215
One can understand the distinction between Holmes’s bad man and a good
man as depending on whether the law is viewed as having moral legitimacy. 216
According to this approach, the bad man acts as if the law has no such legitimacy.
He interprets the law purely out of prudential concern. He wants to know only the
practical consequences of his behavior. In contrast, the good man—again,
according to this approach—views the law as having moral legitimacy, that is, as
providing a moral reason to act or not to act in a particular way. 217 He
contemplates doing what is right and believes the law can inform that decision.
Shapiro’s view can be understood as suggesting that a person interpreting the law
for purely prudential reasons should be able to identify its content in just the same
way—presumably, using the same methods and arriving at the same results—as a
person looking to the law for moral guidance. If Shapiro is right, that would pose a
serious problem for dualism about the nature of the law.
Is it in fact bizarre that the bad man and the good man should have different
views of the content of the law? Not at all. To understand why, it is important to
recognize how limited the claim is about the dual nature of the law. It has no
necessary implications for predicting the coercive use of force by the government.
The bad man and the good man may well be similarly situated when it comes to
anticipating how a judge—or some other official actor—will view the law. The
213

Holmes, supra note 157, at 459.
It would be more precise to speak in terms of the “bad person” and the “good
person,” but, presumably for purposes of clarity, Shapiro follows Holmes in using the
terms “bad man” and “good man”. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 112–13. I do the same.
215
Id. at 112.
216
In other words, the good man adopts an internal perspective, and the bad man an
external perspective, as I have defined those terms. To be clear, Shapiro does not draw the
distinction in just this way. As noted above, he would allow a broader definition of the
“good man,” as apparently does H.L.A. Hart. Id. But my point is that the distinction I offer
in the text is useful in this context.
217
Note that the good man may not view his legal obligations as dispositive. It may be
that the content of the law is relevant to what morality requires, but that countervailing
moral considerations make it moral to violate the law.
214
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bad man would seem as able as the good man to forecast the exercise of power in
the name of the law. 218 Prediction is related to description. To provide a
compelling description of what has occurred is to imply a claim—if only
probabilistic—about what will occur, at least under equivalent circumstances. 219
But, as Shapiro recognizes, a legal positivist account of the law is often
indeterminate. 220 That means predictions about how a court may rule will often
produce mere probabilities: a certain chance that a judge will view the law one way
as opposed to another. That is all the bad man cares about. Recall that his concerns
are purely prudential. In the face of indeterminacy, he will engage in stochastic
reckoning and nothing more. 221
The good man, in contrast, may go a step further. To be sure, he too may care
about prudence. He may undertake just the same analysis as the bad man about the
potential practical consequences of his actions: Will he be prosecuted or sued if he
engages in certain conduct? Will he ultimately prevail in court? But the good man
need not end his efforts there.
To the extent the good man believes the law provides a moral reason to act or
not to act in a certain way—that it has moral legitimacy and, therefore, should be
weighed on the scales of proper conduct—he can resolve some or all of the
indeterminacy in the law that the bad man cannot. To be more precise, the good
man can resolve indeterminacy in a way that would be of no interest to the bad
man. The good man can exercise moral judgment, choose among competing
interpretations of the law, and decide how to act accordingly. To be clear, he gains
no obvious practical advantage over the bad man by doing so. 222 To the contrary,
the good man is trying to figure out how the law constrains him—how it shapes
what he is morally required, permitted, or authorized to do.
The same reasoning applies to judges. A bad judge may care about the content
of the law only for prudential reasons. She may not want to be perceived as lawless
or to be overruled by an appellate court. If the law is not morally legitimate, she
218

Some qualification seems appropriate because it is at least possible that a bad man
is less able to exercise sound moral judgment than a good man and that the moral judgment
of a good man may tend to converge with those of official interpreters. It is conceivable
that a bad man’s badness therefore may impede his efforts at prediction.
219
For a discussion of this point, see LEITER, supra note 36, at 219 (“Thus, to think
we have understood the past event we must think that if we had known what we now take
to explain that event we would have been able to predict its occurrence—at least with
reasonable probability.”).
220
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 267.
221
Note that the bad man would likely find Shapiro’s distinction between the law and
adjudication as having no practical use. He cares how a judge—or some other legal
interpreter—will act based on the law, not how the interpreter parses judgments between
the legal and the moral.
222
Of course, being good may have advantages over being bad. It may, for example,
bring peace of mind. Further, the law could take into account efforts to comply with the
law, including making good faith or plausible judgments about what the law requires. If so,
it may in a sense punish the bad man for being bad. But that hardly seems bizarre.
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has no reason to exercise moral judgment in identifying the content of the law. Her
concern may be only how others will perceive and react to her actions.223
A good judge, in contrast, may have the same prudential concerns as the bad
judge. But she also feels a moral obligation to abide by the law. That moral
commitment will not place her in an advantageous position compared to the bad
judge. Quite the opposite is true. The good judge may at times have to choose
between taking the most prudent path and fulfilling her duty to apply the law as
she sees it. She may feel morally obligated, for example, to decide a case in a way
that will adversely affect her career. There is nothing bizarre about a good judge
being able to resolve contested moral issues in interpreting the law in a way that a
bad judge finds irrelevant. 224
C. Dworkin, Distrust, and Difficulty
Even were Shapiro to accept the possibility of dualism about the nature of
law, he offers various criticisms of natural law. If these criticisms are persuasive,
an understanding of law as sometimes positivist and sometimes natural would be
far less compelling. Key points Shapiro makes in this regard address the theory of
Ronald Dworkin. 225 Two of them warrant particular attention. Any defense of
natural law requires a response to them or a competing account of natural law. The
first issue involves distrust and the second the demanding requirements of natural
law interpretation.
223

She may nonetheless be a moral actor. She may attempt, for example, to rule in
every case to produce a just outcome and feel that the law does not inform what is just or
even that it at times prevents her—for prudential reasons—from doing what is just.
224
I realize this view may appear to give rise to various puzzles. But I do not think
they are difficult to solve upon reflection. One puzzle involves potential circularity. Legal
dualism contemplates that the content of the law depends on whether it has moral
legitimacy, but the opposite is likely true as well: whether the law has moral legitimacy is
apt to depend in part on its content. Does this leave the interpreter no place to start? No. A
person contemplating that the law may have moral legitimacy should interpret it as if it
does and, using that charitable approach, then decide if the law, including the resulting
content, gives rise to moral obligations. If it does, she would have completed an
interpretive task. If not, or if she also has prudential concerns, she can undertake a
positivist interpretation.
Another puzzle involves a person who at first believes the law has moral legitimacy
and then changes her mind. Has the content of the law changed? The answer is that she was
originally able to interpret the law in at least two ways: as morally legitimate, and in light
of any moral judgments she would have to make to give it determinacy; and as purely
descriptive or predictive, recognizing how different interpreters might view the law.
Originally, the former interpretation gave her moral guidance, and the latter interpretation
would be of purely prudential interest. After she changed her mind, the former
interpretation no longer has significance.
225
Shapiro pays far more attention to Dworkin than to any other natural law theorist.
Lon Fuller and John Finnis finish in a distant second and third place, not necessarily in that
order.
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1. Natural Law and Dworkin
Legality is in significant part a response to Dworkin’s arguments, the natural
lawyer whose work Shapiro addresses at greatest length. 226 Dworkin plays such a
central role in the book that a brief summary of his views provides important
background to assessing Shapiro’s position.
Dworkin does not generally call himself a natural lawyer. 227 Nevertheless, he
qualifies as one based on Shapiro’s definition because he is committed to the
position that moral facts play an ultimate role in identifying the content of the
law. 228 One of Dworkin’s main contributions to legal theory is his claim that the
key value in legal interpretation is integrity, that is, that the law should be
interpreted so as to promote what one might call principled consistency. 229
In furtherance of the value of integrity, Dworkin claims legal interpretation
involves two kinds of judgment, one about fit and the other about justification. 230
Fit is descriptive. 231 It includes any nonnormative claims relevant to legal
interpretation, such as potential definitions of the words in a statute, possible rules
that might make sense of binding precedents, or accounts of the workings of
political institutions in a jurisdiction.232 Justification is prescriptive. 233 It involves
moral claims pertaining to legal interpretation, including which definitions of a
statutory text, which rules gleaned from case law, and which accounts of political
institutions would make the law most just. 234
According to Dworkin, legal interpretation requires nested judgments about
fit and justification. 235 A judge determining the applicable law in a case, for
example, might have to ask successive questions about what legal rule best fits and
justifies the relevant precedents, what approach to interpretation best fits and
226

Shapiro dedicates three of fourteen chapters primarily to setting forth and
responding to Dworkin’s position, as well as additional intermittent pages on the subject.
See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 259–330.
227
Dworkin, instead, has recently labeled his approach “interpretivism.” DWORKIN,
supra note 126, at 401.
228
See id. at 405 (arguing that law is ultimately subsumed within political morality);
Dworkin, supra note 41, at 165 (“If the crude description of natural law I just gave is
correct, that any theory which makes the content of law sometimes depend on the correct
answer to some moral question is a natural law theory, then I am guilty of natural law.”).
229
Dworkin’s most complete development of the concept of integrity can be found in
LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 63, at 176–275. For background on why the term “principled
consistency” is preferable to “consistency,” see id. at 219–24.
230
See id. at 242–49; see also Dworkin, supra note 41, at 170.
231
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 63, at 242, 245–48; see also Dworkin,
supra note 41, at 170.
232
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 63, at 242, 245–247; see also Dworkin,
supra note 41, at 170.
233
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 63, at 242–44.
234
The parallel to stare decisis in common law strengthens his position. It means his
interpretive theory fits practice.
235
Id. at 254–58.
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justifies her role in the legal system, what understanding of the legal institutions
best fits and justifies them, and so on up to and including fundamental issues of
political morality. 236 At each level, the judge must balance fit and justification. 237
The nested judgments allow legal interpretation to remain true to the actual
practice in a particular jurisdiction while also pursuing a principled consistency
between outcomes across cases, legal rules, political institutions, and the like. 238
Shapiro makes various points that are applicable to Dworkin’s argument. The
ones most relevant to legal dualism might be summarized as follows: first,
Dworkin’s approach is insufficiently attentive to the circumstances of legality and,
in particular, to the lack of trust our legal system often places in legal interpreters
to resolve moral issues for themselves; 239 and, second, Dworkin’s interpretive
methodology is just too demanding, requiring ordinary legal interpreters to resolve
profound philosophical issues in determining the content of the law. 240 Neither of
these points proves fatal to natural law.
2. Distrust and Fit
Shapiro criticizes Dworkin’s theory of interpretation as assuming that legal
interpreters in general—and judges in particular—act in good faith and have
extraordinary competence. 241 Shapiro rightly points out that our legal system
embodies a great deal of distrust—doubts about the intentions and abilities of legal
interpreters. 242 In that sense, Dworkin’s understanding seems to fit our legal
system rather poorly. He contemplates judges engaging in a free ranging
philosophical inquiry in deciding cases. Is criticism of such an approach fatal to
Dworkin’s theory and does it, therefore, strike a serious blow against natural law in
general?
The answer requires distinguishing between Dworkin’s writings and the best
possible understanding of natural law. Shapiro offers a rich and detailed account of
what he calls the economy of trust—the way in which distrust can permeate a legal
system and shape the proper interpretive methodologies of various legal actors. 243
He also makes a strong case that such distrust plays a large role in our legal
system. 244 Dworkin does not take adequate account of distrust. But Shapiro’s
valuable critique can be understood as offering a friendly amendment—one that

236

Id.
Id.
238
For an additional brief summary of Dworkin’s position, see Joshua P. Davis,
Cardozo’s Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 777, 809–10
(1993).
239
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 307–30.
240
Id. at 325, 329.
241
Id. at 309–10, 329.
242
Id. at 312–29.
243
Id. at 331–52.
244
Id. at 312–29.
237
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does not necessarily conflict with Dworkin’s theory or, at least, with a natural law
theory that otherwise shares many of the same commitments as Dworkin’s.
Natural law can accommodate distrust. Judges—and other legal interpreters—
can take into account the economy of trust in deciding how they should go about
interpreting the law. Indeed, according to Dworkin’s theory, they are obligated to
do so. Judges should recognize the extent to which our legal system embodies
doubts about legal officials, including judges. In Dworkin’s terms, any account of
legal interpretation that ignores such skepticism does not fit our legal system very
well.
As necessary, natural law theory can be adapted—should be adapted—in a
way that incorporates the economy of trust. True, Dworkin asks legal interpreters
to undertake a searching inquiry into the nature of the law and the legal system.
But that searching inquiry should be pursued with great humility—and deference
to other actors—if such an approach would reflect the best understanding of the
legal system in which an interpreter finds herself. 245
Indeed, a natural law understanding could enhance Shapiro’s account of the
role of trust in legal interpretation. He would ask judges and others to reconstruct
the views of the planners of a legal system about the good faith and competence of
political actors. But, as discussed above, for an interpreter seeking moral guidance
from the law, that attempt will inevitably lead to disagreements that require moral
judgment. It may prove more productive—perhaps for the very reason planning is
productive—for legal interpreters in some cases to exercise their own moral
judgment about what counts as good faith and what counts as competence in legal
interpretation and to let those judgments inform their view of the allocation of trust
that best fits our legal system. To use Dworkin’s language, the implications of trust
for legal interpretation are a matter not only of fit, but also of justification.
Shapiro’s argument about distrust can be understood not as conflicting with natural
law but rather as enriching it and being enriched by it.
3. Difficulty: Zeno’s Paradox
If Dworkin’s approach to interpretation must be adapted to accommodate
distrust, that could strengthen another criticism Shapiro makes. He claims that
Dworkin imposes too great a burden on legal interpreters, requiring them to engage
in a complex and highly philosophical form of reasoning. 246 Dworkin’s selection
of Hercules as a model interpreter can be taken to suggest the daunting nature of

245

For a thoughtful discussion of Dworkin’s commitment to fit, its implications for
judicial humility, and the tension with his analysis of particular legal problems, see
generally Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1269 (1997).
246
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 325, 329.
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the task he proposes. 247 Shapiro claims that many legal interpreters are not capable
of the required analysis. 248 Few judges are demigods.
Considerations of distrust may just add another layer to an already formidable
undertaking. On top of engaging in the sort of elaborate analysis that Dworkin
prescribes, legal interpreters would have to determine how much trust the system
places in them and, potentially, make value judgments about how much trust they
in fact deserve. If Dworkin’s theory of interpretation already asks too much of
legal interpreters, taking seriously Shapiro’s refinement of that theory could make
matters worse.
Before addressing this point, however, note that it is not at all clear that
Shapiro’s recommended approach to legal interpretation is any easier to apply than
Dworkin’s. True, Shapiro would spare interpreters a foray into political theory. But
Shapiro acknowledges that legal theory is relevant to legal practice and contending
with Shapiro’s own book on jurisprudence, Legality, would be quite challenging
for most judges, lawyers, and law students—even though it is extraordinarily well
written and lucid. Jurisprudence is simply not that accessible a subject.
Moreover, Shapiro would replace philosophical inquiry with challenging
sociological, historical, and institutional analyses, involving a nuanced
understanding of who the planners were of a legal system, what their attitudes were
regarding the absolute and relative good faith and competence of various actors,
and what those views dictate for the interpretive methodologies of various players
in a complicated legal system. 249 These difficult judgments are required, for
example, because of Shapiro’s distinction between an authority system and an
opportunistic system and the implications of that distinction. It is no mean feat to
identify the relevant authoritative decision makers and determine their views on
the extent to which a system of law warrants deference because of the political
legitimacy of its planners or because of the justness of its laws.
In this regard, we should not let the word “fact” lull us into a false sense of
certainty. Many social facts—especially the social facts that Shapiro concedes his
Planning Theory makes relevant—are every bit as contestable and difficult to
determine as many moral facts.
From a practical perspective, however, Shapiro’s interpretive theory is not
nearly as outlandish as it may sound. Most legal interpreters could—and would—
do fine to understand the basic ideas behind Shapiro’s theory and to apply them as
best they can given limited knowledge, time, and abilities.
The same is true for Dworkin as well. Applying Dworkin’s approach is not
nearly as impractical as Shapiro makes it out to be. Shapiro’s argument is a bit like
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox: he has made sound difficult, if not impossible,
something that in practice occurs routinely.
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Dworkin recognizes this issue. See DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 263 (noting critics
may say Hercules is arrogant).
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See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 312–13.
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See id. at 350–52 (discussing judgments necessary to decide how to interpret law
in a particular legal system).

98

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

This point applies with particular force to combining Shapiro’s insight about
distrust with Dworkin’s overall interpretive methodology. It is not that hard for a
legal interpreter to understand that she should apply the law as best she can, taking
into account how the overall legal system works, what the law says, and her views
about what the law is and what it should be trying to achieve. Nor is it all that
difficult for her to recognize that in doing so she should be humble and respect the
ways in which others might not trust her motives or abilities. Many judges in our
legal system would likely view this mindset as quite familiar. They no doubt do all
of this at times, even if largely in an intuitive manner.
Indeed, Shapiro’s gloss on Dworkin can help to explain the modesty of many
judges and the leadership role played by only a few major judicial figures. Most
judges may approach legal interpretation in a relatively circumscribed and
localized manner, hesitating, for example, to make significant changes in one area
of the law to reconcile it with others. These judges may correctly suspect—again,
perhaps intuitively and implicitly—that they are apt to err if they adopt too broad a
perspective, upsetting expectations, sowing confusion, and creating inconsistencies
rather than curing them. A few prominent judges, however, may have an unusual
sense of the total interpretive picture, a rare capacity for philosophical reflection,
and the prominence to get others to follow. 250 A focus on Shapiro’s economy of
trust, in other words, may deepen our understanding of how the law in fact evolves
and why most judges should engage in legal interpretation as they currently do.
4. Moral Legitimacy: Distrust and Difficulty Redux
Shapiro’s criticisms of Dworkin face a final obstacle. Although Shapiro takes
no position on when the law has moral legitimacy, legal interpreters aspiring to act
morally must do so. That includes judges. They must determine when morality
requires them to follow the law and when it permits or requires them to stray from
it.
In addressing this issue, Shapiro has a few options: he could take the position
that legal interpreters never have a moral obligation to follow the law. If so, his
Planning Theory would seem to be an empty exercise. Law does not provide a very
useful plan if no one ever has a moral obligation to follow it. But Legality seems to
foreclose this approach. To his credit, Shapiro assumes, at least for purposes of
argument, that the law at times has moral legitimacy. 251
A second, more plausible view would be that the law at times has moral
legitimacy and that to determine whether it does requires careful analysis. The
issue is likely to depend, for example, on political and a complex set of moral and
factual considerations. One might imagine that in a particularly just legal order the
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For a discussion of the potential role of prestigious judges in the development of
the law, see Davis, supra note 238, at 816–18.
251
Shapiro at least does not rule out the possibility of the law being morally
legitimate, SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 184, and at times assumes that it sometimes is. See id.
at 349.
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law often has moral legitimacy, that in a particularly unjust legal order it rarely
does, and that in legal regimes between the two extremes no such generalization is
possible. It may even be that within many legal systems—perhaps ours—moral
legitimacy might vary with the law, its application, the legal interpreter (e.g.,
judge, juror, lawyer, citizen, legislator), and the context (e.g., attorney arguing in a
brief as opposed to advising a client). 252
Assuming the necessity of some form of analysis along these lines, the issue
of moral legitimacy poses grave problems for Shapiro’s arguments based on
distrust and difficulty. After all, in deciding a case a judge must determine not only
what the law is, but also whether she should follow it. Even putting aside the space
created for moral judgment by the gap Shapiro’s creates between the law and
adjudication, a judge must decide if she should act as a good man (or woman) or a
bad man (or woman). 253 In other words, should she understand the law according
to her best effort at interpretation or should she decide how she wants a case to
come out and then determine whether she can provide a sufficiently plausible legal
defense of the outcome that she reaches for other reasons?
The judge’s determination of how she should act seems to entail the sort of
discretion and difficulty Shapiro denies is appropriate for a judge. Yet the
economy of trust does little work if a judge is constrained in identifying the content
of the law but must exercise significant moral judgment in deciding whether she
should follow the law. Similarly, even assuming Shapiro’s legal positivism
imposes a less daunting task on judges than Dworkin’s natural law, that difference
would seem to be lost if a deep philosophical inquiry is necessary for the judge to
decide when the law guides what she should do.
A third possibility is available to Shapiro that would avoid these problems. It
may be that legal interpreters always—or almost always—have a moral obligation
to abide by the law. If so, the law may function well as a plan, and legal
interpreters in deciding whether the law binds them morally may exercise little, if
any, judgment and face a minor, if any, challenge. But the possibility that the law
generally is morally legitimate gives rise to a separate difficulty for Shapiro. As
discussed in the next section, it appears to leave the legal positivist scant room to
hold judges accountable for their legal interpretations. If so, it turns out that a
criticism Shapiro levels against natural lawyers actually applies with greater force
to his own version of legal positivism.
D. The Possibility of a Critique of the Law
Shapiro implies another argument against natural law. He suggests that only
legal positivism allows for a critical perspective on the law:
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An analysis along these lines is suggested, for example, in ABNER S. GREENE,
AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(2012).
253
I rely here on the definition of this distinction in Part IV.B, supra.
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In fact, the freedom to critique the law depends on its moral neutrality.
To see this, imagine the difficulty of criticizing a norm whose content
was morally inflected. Suppose the content of a law mandating
conscription to an unjust war were best rendered as: “All men between
eighteen and forty-five are obligated to enlist in the army for the
duration of the war against Oceana.” It would seem to follow that the
law obligates conscription. Yet, since the war is unjust, it is proper to
criticize the law and even to deny that men between eighteen and fortyfive are obligated to enlist in the army. The would-be reformer finds
herself in the awkward, even impossible, situation of conceding in the
active voice what she denies in the passive voice. She must say that the
law obligates persons to act in a manner they are not obligated to act,
which is a contradiction. 254
Shapiro seems to suggest that the natural lawyer cannot explain how a legal
interpreter can be critical of the law, much less hold the view that morality could
require her to disobey it.
Legal dualism supplies a ready answer to Shapiro’s argument when the law is
so unjust as to lack any moral force at all. The way to approach law lacking moral
legitimacy is purely descriptive. That is when legal positivism plays its role. In
other words, according to legal dualism, natural law provides a way of
understanding—and identifying the content of—the law regarding enlistment only
if it has moral legitimacy.
Two other possible situations, however, require a subtler analysis. The first
occurs if the law has moral legitimacy, a legal interpreter has a moral obligation to
follow it, but the law would be more just if it were changed. Shapiro implies that
this position is untenable from a natural law perspective. It is not.
The key point here is to distinguish between morality informing the law—or,
as Shapiro puts the matter, the law being “morally inflected” 255 —and the law
always being perfectly just. Natural law is not committed to the latter proposition:
that the law is always perfectly just. According to Shapiro, natural law claims only
that the content of the law depends in part on moral facts, not entirely on moral
facts. 256 So, for example, the legal interpreter might make the judgment—based
partially on social facts and partially on moral facts—that the legal system in
which she finds herself places the authority to make the law and to go to war in the
legislature, that the legislature has chosen to pursue an unjust war and to impose an
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SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 231–32.
Id. at 232.
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Recall the asymmetry in Shapiro’s definition of natural law and legal positivism.
See supra note 43. Legal positivism holds that the content of the law depends ultimately
only on social facts. See supra Part II.B. But natural law does not entail that the law
depends ultimately only on moral facts—just that it depends in part on moral facts. Id. A
more aggressive natural law position might claim that the content of the law depends
ultimately or even entirely only on moral facts. These more aggressive positions might be
incompatible with a critique of the law.
255
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unjust draft in doing so, and that, despite the unjustness of the war and the draft,
the legislature nonetheless has sufficient legitimacy that morality requires
obedience to the law. None of this is inconsistent with the possibility that the
system would be more just if the legislature abandoned the mandatory draft and,
indeed, the unjust war.
In other words, morality could well figure in specifying the content of the law,
but the relevant moral and social facts may leave a legal interpreter limited wiggle
room. Legal interpretation, to borrow Dworkin’s terminology, must still “fit” any
properly adopted law. 257 Moreover, the relevant moral facts are not limited to the
justness of the ultimate law at issue, but also include the relative political
legitimacy and competence of various political actors. Indeed, the interpreter may
be all the more constrained by what Shapiro calls the “economy of trust.” 258 She
may have to emphasize fit over justification in recognition of how little faith the
legal system does—and perhaps should—place in her. Given these constraints, the
legal interpreter may well conclude that requiring enlistment is substantively
unjust—that the ultimate rule taken on its own terms is a bad one—but that the
system as a whole is sufficiently just that she nevertheless has a moral obligation
to follow the law. Under these circumstances, she could still legitimately agitate
for legal reform.
A second situation is similar, although perhaps more subtle yet. A legal
interpreter would be perfectly coherent in concluding that a law has moral
legitimacy—that it provides some reason to act in a particular way—but that other
countervailing moral considerations outweigh her moral obligation to follow the
law. Again, morality may influence the interpreter’s view of the law but may not
leave her enough room to resist understanding it as requiring enlistment. The
pedigree of the law may give it some moral weight, but the morally noxious nature
of the law may have even more moral weight. The balance may weigh against
enlistment.
No commitment of natural law prevents this sort of reasoning. Under natural
law, moral facts shape legal interpretation but so do social facts, and the law is not
always so pliable as to allow an interpreter to conclude that what the law requires
is morally defensible, all things considered. In sum, pace Shapiro, the freedom to
critique—or protest or even disobey—the law does not require moral neutrality but
merely some gap between the content of the law and perfect justice.
To be clear, the above reasoning depends in part on judgments about which it
attempts to remain neutral. Different theories of morality, political theory, and
moral legitimacy may complicate—or simplify—the analysis. The key point,
however, is that nothing about the way Shapiro defines natural law makes it
inconsistent with legal interpreters criticizing the law, asserting that the law should
be reformed, or even concluding that morality requires civil disobedience. Natural
law is compatible with a critique of the law. Indeed, as discussed in the next
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Dworkin, supra note 41, at 170–71.
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 331–36.
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section, the irony is that Shapiro’s legal positivism may limit the possibilities for
seeking legal reform whereas he ascribes that flaw to natural law.
V. PRACTICALITY, IRONY, AUDACITY
The argument thus far has pursued three main claims: first, Shapiro has not
explained how positivism can provide an account of the law that is capable of
offering moral guidance; second, notwithstanding his argument to the contrary, his
Planning Theory can be reconciled with natural law; and third, he has offered no
compelling criticisms of natural law and, thus, has not precluded the possibility of
legal dualism. If all this is true, a natural query is whether these theoretical points
make any practical difference.
A. Practicality and Irony
By this point, the reader may well wonder whether the jurisprudential dispute
between natural law and legal positivism matters. Shapiro claims it does; he asserts
that legal theory informs legal practice.259 That is important. It would be odd to put
so much energy into an endeavor that has no practical significance. 260 Shapiro’s
view of the relationship between legal theory and legal practice explains why
Legality is relevant to the practice of law.
But that commitment also makes Shapiro’s argument troubling. If Shapiro’s
legal theory affects practice, it necessarily constrains legal interpreters, including
judges. We can see how it would do so. If Shapiro is right about exclusive legal
positivism, for example, judges cannot make moral judgments in saying what the
law is. If they do so, they are not following the law. That is a significant constraint.
The extent of this constraint should not be overstated. Shapiro recognizes that
legal interpreters may not always have an obligation to follow the law and that in
adjudicating disputes, judges may have to make moral judgments, including in
creating new law. Still, many judges may well believe that they generally apply
existing law (rather than make new law) and that they have a moral obligation to
do so. In these instances, if Shapiro is right, judges have limited options. They can
choose to follow the law. Or they can choose to flout the law. What they cannot
do, however, is take their own moral judgments into account in determining the
content of the law. Shapiro’s theory precludes that possibility.
This position gives rise to irony. A significant motivation behind modern
legal positivism is to enable criticism of the law. To this effect, Shapiro quotes a
passage by H.L.A. Hart about Bentham:
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SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 22–25, 30–32.
For this reason it is somewhat disturbing that in attempting to defend exclusive
legal positivism, Joseph Raz suggests legal theory may not affect legal interpretation. See
JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 33–36 (2009) (responding to
DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 63, at 201–03). For a discussion of Raz’s
position—labeling it the retreat from abstraction—see Davis, supra note 87, at 6–7, 10–11.
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Bentham contemplated and elaborately documented the abuses of the
English law of his day, the fantastic prolixity and obscurity of its
statutes, the complexity and expense of its court procedure, the
artificiality and irrationality of its modes of proof. He was horrified by
these things, but even more horrified by the ease with which English
lawyers swallowed and propagated the enervating superstition that these
abuses were natural and inevitable, so that only a visionary would dream
of their radical reform. He believed that only those who had been
blinded to the truth that laws were human artefacts could acquiesce in
these absurdities and injustices as things to be ascribed to [human]
nature; and one way of opening men’s eyes was to preach to them the
simple but important doctrine that laws were but expressions of the
human will. Law is something that men add to the world, not find within
it. 261
In a sense, Shapiro takes the lesson to heart that people make the law rather
than merely find it. According to Shapiro, planners create the law and a system for
making further law. For any given legal content, his approach should allow us to
trace the actor or actors responsible for putting in place the law as it is.
In another sense, however, Shapiro’s approach does not fully take account of
the extent to which the law is a human artifact, a limitation that has practical and
theoretical consequences. At a practical level, Shapiro’s theory could blunt
criticism of judicial practice, masking the frequency with which judges exercise
moral judgment in saying what the law is and making it more difficult to hold them
accountable for doing so.
Moreover, at a theoretical level, Shapiro appears to treat the nature of law
itself as in part fixed—something to be discovered by investigating truisms rather
than open to debate, moral criticism, and reform. 262 It seems the nature of law
simply is the way it is. It cannot be adapted to human needs, even when there are
good enough reasons to do so.
Shapiro’s commitment to the practical relevance of legal theory binds these
two points together. If the nature of law is in some sense incorrigible—not subject
to criticism and modification on moral grounds—and if theoretical arguments
about the nature of law inform legal practice—as Shapiro believes—then to some
extent the nature of law introduces rigidity into the content of the law. Some
readings of the content of the law—understood broadly, as including how the law
should be given content and by whom—are simply unavailable. Most obviously,
according to Shapiro, the law simply cannot be something that depends ultimately
in part on moral facts for its content, no matter how attractive that option might be
261

SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 389 (quoting H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 26

(1982)).
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Shapiro at one point questions “whether a jurisprudential theory ought to be
rejected simply because its acceptance engenders morally bad consequences,” not
necessarily ruling out that possibility, but expressing skepticism about it, implying he is
relying on no such moral argument. Id. at 255–56.
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as a matter of political theory or political morality. 263 Indeed, Shapiro at one point
questions whether bad moral consequences can provide a reason to reject an
understanding of the nature of law at all. 264
A more complete account of Shapiro’s philosophical methodology would be
helpful. Why does he put so much faith in truisms about the nature of law? Why
does he believe that those truisms are sufficiently consistent—across different
times, cultures, and jurisdictions—to form a single, coherent understanding of law?
What is the nature of the truth the truisms produce and how do we gain access to
it? And how, finally, can we reconcile a nonmoral account of law’s innate features
with the lesson from Bentham that law is something that people add to the world,
not find within it? Shapiro does not say.
B. Audacity
Shapiro’s position seems to derive in part from a commitment to humility. He
is critical of theorists who ask legal interpreters to assume what he calls the God’seye approach or God’s-eye view. 265 Those theorists ask interpreters to resolve
moral issues in deciding what the law requires rather than to determine what some
other authoritative decision maker thought of those moral issues.
Adopting the God’s-eye view seems immodest. No one, we may think, should
play God. But at times someone has to do so, at least in the sense that someone has
to assume responsibility for exercising moral judgment. And it is worse to play
God and pretend otherwise than to take ownership of the role. A false modesty can
be a way of evading accountability—arrogance cloaked as humility.
None of this is to say that a particular jurisprudential perspective correlates to
a particular interpretive methodology. A proper understanding of our legal system
may require a judge in a constitutional case, for example, to defer to legislative
judgment, to undertake a robust originalist analysis, to interpret the Constitution as
a living document, etc. But however the judge decides to proceed in legal
interpretation, in a complex system like ours she can fulfill any duty she has to
follow the law only by grappling with difficult moral issues. The moral issues may
be abstract. Her exercise in moral judgment may cause her to interpret her role
narrowly—perhaps as requiring her to engage in as mechanical a form of legal
interpretation as possible. 266 But she must make moral judgments nonetheless. She
should feel the full weight of them. And she should rule accordingly.
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See id. at 45 (“[I]f the positivist solutions are correct, and the law rests on social
facts alone, then the only way to definitively determine the fundamental rules of a
particular legal system and its proper interpretive methodology is to engage in sociological
inquiry.”).
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Id. at 255.
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Id. at 346–49.
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A view along these lines underlies, for example, Justice Scalia’s preferred
approach to constitutional interpretation. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
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Justice Scalia provides a notable example. He has long championed
constraints on judges making moral judgments. 267 He says the point of a written
Constitution is to resolve moral issues. 268 Hear the echo in Shapiro. 269 But a
written Constitution may serve other purposes. It may, for example, serve to frame
the moral judgments that later interpreters should make. Choosing between these
positions requires consideration of issues of political morality: who should be
vested with authority to make moral judgments, how judgments about political
legitimacy and substantive justice should figure in allocating that responsibility,
and so on. Indeed, when Dworkin raised the challenge in A Matter of
Interpretation that Scalia’s somewhat varying views on how best to interpret the
Constitution depend on his views of political morality—in particular, on Scalia’s
ambivalence about majority rule—Scalia provided no meaningful response. 270 He
did not deny that moral judgment lies at the foundation of his interpretive theory.
Shapiro’s attempt to avoid this ineluctable role for moral judgment is
unavailing. He would have us rely on the views of the planners about the economy
of trust. But, as he acknowledges, who counts as a planner and the relevance of the
planners’ views depend on issues of political morality—on their political
legitimacy and the substantive justness of the laws they put in place. 271 Again,
these points follow from his distinction between an authority system and an
opportunistic system. He can—he does—try to circumvent this problem by
suggesting we rely on the views of the planners about these issues. 272 But that just
replicates the difficulties. Which planners? Which of their views? Why? It is
turtles all the way down. 273 A moral judgment is necessary at some point to
determine which social facts matter in specifying the content of the law.
None of this means that legal positivism fails completely in offering an
account of the law. To the contrary, if all we are doing is describing or predicting
legal practice—and can leave all of its uncertainty intact—legal positivism may
well provide a satisfying account—perhaps the only satisfying account—of the
law. But when legal interpreters look to the law for moral guidance, they need to
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 3, 40–41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
267
Id. at 38–41.
268
See id.
269
Shapiro discusses, with approval, Scalia’s deference to the planners’ views,
including regarding the economy of trust. See SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 345.
270
Compare Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 266, at 115, 125–27 (arguing that Scalia’s
commitment to majoritarian ideals regarding statutory textualism contrasts with his
“reservations about majority rule” with regard to constitutional interpretation), with
Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW, supra note 266, at 129, 144–49 (providing no response to Dworkin’s claims of
ambivalence toward majoritarian ideals).
271
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 350–51.
272
Id. at 382.
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See STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG
THEORY TO BLACK HOLES 1 (1st ed. 1988).
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make moral judgments—even if only foundational moral judgments—to enable
them to reach sufficiently determinate conclusions about the content of the law. 274
Recognizing this reality allows us to hold judges and others accountable.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the analysis so far is correct, Hume’s Law appears to pose an
insurmountable obstacle to legal positivism when the law serves as a source of
moral guidance. This conclusion has implications both for any particular theory
about the nature of the law, including the Planning Theory, and for jurisprudence
more generally.
A. Enriching the Planning Theory
The Planning Theory constitutes a major contribution to jurisprudence. It
provides a rich way to understand the law, one with significant implications,
including for what Shapiro calls the economy of trust. But what it does not do is
permit legal positivism to overcome the difficulties of Hume’s Law.
And an embrace of legal positivism comes at a cost to the development and
defense of any theory of the nature of the law, including the Planning Theory.
Assuming that legal theory informs interpretation—that it is not merely an
academic enterprise, divorced from the actual legal practice 275—legal positivism
greatly constrains the kind of arguments available to support any theory of the law.
After all, if legal theory informs legal content, then moral arguments in support of
the Planning Theory would mean that the content of the law ultimately—at the
abstract level of theory 276 —depends at least in part on moral facts—on how
interpreters should understand the law. Such an approach would constitute an
abandonment of legal positivism in favor of natural law.
274

This conclusion follows most readily if there is pervasive disagreement about the
content of the law and how to identify it, as Shapiro acknowledges there is. SHAPIRO, supra
note 1, at 256–57, 283, 379. However, even if there is consensus, it would seem judgments
about political morality may be necessary to decide that the consensus suffices for the
existence of law. Shapiro himself, for example, attributes an intrinsic moral aim to the law.
Id. at 213–17. Apparently, according to Shapiro, even if participants in a system agree it is
legal and agree about its contents, it may not qualify as a legal system if it does not pursue
the appropriate moral aim. Id. He offers the mafia as an example. Id. at 214–16. So it
would seem disagreement may not be necessary to contest Shapiro’s attempt to defend
legal positivism. Even when there is no disagreement about the content of an institution
that its participants call law, a foundational moral judgment may be necessary to determine
whether the institution qualifies as law. See Gardner & Macklem, supra note 122 (raising a
concern along these lines).
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Shapiro makes this assumption. SHAPIRO, supra note 1 at 22–25, 30–32.
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As noted above, Shapiro is somewhat vague about what he means by the word
“ultimately” in his definition of legal positivism. See supra Part II.B. The text assumes that
foundational, theoretical commitments count as “ultimate” in the relevant sense.

2014]

LEGALITY, MORALITY, DUALITY

107

As a result of this conundrum, Shapiro’s case for the Planning Theory is quite
constrained. He largely refrains from arguing that interpreters should understand
the law according to the Planning Theory, contending instead merely that they can
do so. That is unfortunate. His commitment to positivism prevents him from
providing the kind of robust moral defense of the Planning Theory that it
deserves—and that it requires when law provides moral guidance. It also restricts
him from addressing directly various moral questions relevant to developing the
Planning Theory. When should legal interpreters defer to judgments made by
planners? When should interpreters make their own judgments? Who should count
as a planner?
The Planning Theory is valuable, but it is not morally neutral. The law can
serve purposes other than facilitating planning. It can, for example, seek to produce
just outcomes or promote political legitimacy. The goals of planning, substantive
justice, and self-determination may at times conflict. 277 Moral judgments are
necessary to make the case that planning is more important than these other noble
ends law serves, at least in some circumstances and to some extent. This issue
should be addressed—must be addressed—in unabashedly moral terms to guide a
person morally bound to follow the law. Description and logic will not suffice.
B. Offering a Different Way Forward in Jurisprudence
The significance of legal dualism, however, has far greater scope than merely
enriching our understanding of any particular theory of the law, including the
Planning Theory. If natural law provides the best account of the law when it serves
as a source of moral guidance and legal positivism when it does not, then we can
put aside a debate in jurisprudence that has vexed and preoccupied scholars for
decades if not centuries. No longer need we worry about the single best account of
the law. There isn’t one. Natural law and legal positivist theories serve different,
complementary purposes.
We can focus instead on determining when the law has moral legitimacy. The
line between when it does and does not forms a natural boundary between the
terrain of natural law and legal positivism. Recognizing that boundary holds the
promise of a new way forward in jurisprudence.
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Of course, any apparent conflict may be illusory. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note
126, at 1 (arguing for unity of value).

